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Wolfram: A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice

A CAUTIONARY TALE: FIDUCIARY BREACH AS
LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Charles W. Wolfram*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars commonly refer to lawyers as
fiduciaries, generally meaning agents who bear special and onerous
duties toward clients. What is often missing from the incantation is a
settled notion of the legal content of the concept and the part that such
content should play in a client's lawsuit against a lawyer. The topic of
fiduciary breach as a theory of recovery in a client's lawsuit is surely not
new, 1 and its asserted advantages and justifications have received some
attention from legal scholars.2 Nonetheless, restiveness about the
fiduciary breach concept continues to surface in some court opinions, 3
suggesting that present understanding and application of the concept
might be unsound. A different, and narrower, formulation of lawyerfiduciary-liability doctrine might in fact be overdue, and that is
attempted here.
This exercise was inspired in part by earlier efforts to come to grips
with a similar set of issues in the course of drafting the Restatement of
* Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor Emeritus, Cornell Law School. This is a revision of a
paper presented at the Hofstra University School of Law 2005 Legal Ethics Conference on October
30, 2005. The author thanks conference participants who commented on the earlier version.
Surviving errors are, of course, the author's.
1. See, e.g., Roy Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and
Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994). For the
extensive scholarly writing on fiduciary breach generally, see sources cited infra notes 2, 62, and
64.
2. See, e.g., Anderson & Steele, supra note 1; John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and
Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 112-17 (1995) (noting the indeterminate
nature of fiduciary breach liability as distinguished from negligence liability). But see Meredith J.
Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of FiduciaryDuty Claim Does Not
Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137 (1999) (criticizing the perceived extravagant uses
of fiduciary breach theory and recommending sharp restrictions on the doctrine).
3. On restiveness reflected in the case law, see infra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
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the Law Governing Lawyers.4 We reporters at an early point had
concluded that the fiduciary breach concept generally lacked
independent content as a liability rule and that it should be mentioned
only as another way of conceptualizing the "duty" element of
professional negligence, the broad notion that a lawyer must conduct
representation of a client as would a lawyer of ordinary care and
prudence, 5 with a limited, and beyond-negligence, application in
instances of intentionalbreaches of fiduciary duty.6 That proposal was
stoutly resisted by many in the Restatement's advisory groups.
Chastened, we returned with a suitably bifurcated treatment, setting out
in its own section-section 49 in the published version, 7 the notion of
liability of a lawyer to client for "breach of fiduciary duty" in addition to
the now-traditional and general basis of liability for professional
negligence-section 48.8 That approach also had the effect, always
soothing to an audience of ALI members, many of whom are anxious
about forging into new territory, of conforming the Restatement to the
majority position 9 under contemporary common law.
Thus, as with the mine run of court decisions, the final version of
section 49 contemplates two general paths by which a client injured by a
lawyer's non-intentional act could recover against the lawyer, the claim
for negligent legal malpractice ("negligence") and the separate claim for
breach of fiduciary duty ("fiduciary breach"). Aside from the specific
element that might define the fiduciary duty and its breach, the other
elements that the client would have to prove in a fiduciary breach claim
would be the same as those involved in a claim of negligence: causation
and damages. The implications, obviously, were that the fiduciary
breach claim stood on equal and firm merits as a basis for recovery, and
that a legal-malpractice plaintiff perhaps should enjoy the option of
pursuing either theory as the plaintiff chose, or both theories
simultaneously. On further reflection, I am now convinced that neither

4.

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. I

served as chief reporter for the Restatement. The Restatement as finally approved was preceded by
many early drafts, culminating in a set of proposed final drafts. The Restatement was finally
approved by the American Law Institute in May 1998. The Restatement appeared in a two-volume
set in 2000. Citations to earlier drafts will note the relevant draft number and date.
5. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 72 cmit. f (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997). For one version of
the Restatement debates on fiduciary breach doctrine, see Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the
Law GoverningLawyers: A View from the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697, 718-42 (1998).
6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 76A (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997).
7. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 49 (2000).
8. Id. § 48 (2000).
9. See infra Part VI.A. 1.
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the final version of section 49 nor the reporters' original position reflects
the best approach, although the latter was much closer to the mark.
Existing scholarly analysis of the fiduciary breach ground for
recovery in legal malpractice is, to my mind, either too accepting or too
broadly critical of the existing state of affairs. Representative of the
overly accepting scholarship is a 1994 article by Professors Roy
Anderson and Walter Steele. ° The article concludes that the fiduciary
breach theory as applied to lawyers is commendably fluid and vague;"
that, while negligence is based on a claim of breach of a standard of
care, fiduciary breach is properly based on a claim of breach of a
standard of conduct; that a fiduciary breach standard exists that provides
a readily distinct and workable description of actionable and nonactionable lawyer activities; 12 and that a lawyer can violate both the
standard of care (negligence) as well as the standard of conduct
(fiduciary breach) under many imaginable circumstances.1 3 Nonetheless,
in the last sentence of the article the authors urge that existing law be
changed to unify "legal malpractice as a hybrid of tort and contract and
to establish a consistent set of14rules, perhaps by statute, for actions
involving attorney wrongdoing.,
A more recent article by Professor Meredith Duncan 5 would
severely limit the availability of fiduciary breach claims, for example,
generally eliminating its availability in fiduciary breach as well as in feedisgorgement and constructive-trust settings.1 6 The only surviving
fiduciary breach claims would involve instances of highly egregious
lawyer wrongdoing, in which the plaintiff-client can also make a "but
for" showing of causation of financial harm. Professor Duncan finds
fault with what she describes as courts' unwarranted extension of the
fiduciary breach basis for lawyer liability. Duncan's description of

10.

Anderson & Steele, supra note 1.

11.

Id. at 239-40.

12. Id. at 249-50. The authors do not argue, however, that the limited application of the
fiduciary breach concept to lawyers fills a void left by the insufficient coverage of negligence law.
They simply describe it as narrower than negligence. Compare discussion infra Part IV.B.4.
(arguing that the fiduciary breach concept has a limited range of application), with discussion infra
Part IV.B.2. (noting the attempted dichotomy between care and conduct).
13. Anderson & Steele, supra note 1, at 250-51. The breadth of this reading may be
unintended. The authors demonstrate the dual application of negligence and fiduciary breach by
analyzing Homes v. Drucker, 411 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991), where the plaintiff was
relying on two independent sets of facts, with one attached to a negligence claim and the other to a
fiduciary breach claim.
14. Anderson & Steele, supra note 1, at 268-69.
15. See Duncan, supra note 2.
16. Compareinfra Part III.A-B.
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fiduciary breach law (as applied to lawyers) is overstated at several
points, 17 and her recommended substantive limitations seem far too
restrictive. Nonetheless, our differences, while substantial, are largely
irrelevant for present purposes. Whether or not courts have distorted
legal-malpractice law by formulating novel and extravagant rules for
fiduciary breach claims that are unheard of in negligence actions (which
I do not believe has occurred outside of isolated instances), my
complaint is that courts have allowed fiduciary breach claims to
proliferate needlessly on the same ground already adequately occupied
by negligence. I argue, not for limiting the liability of lawyers, but for
pruning back fiduciary breach claims when they merely duplicate
negligence-based claims. While fiduciary breach law is flawed, it is not
because of its exotic and rank departures from negligence law. To the
contrary, most fiduciary breach claims are problematic precisely because
of their almost complete and useless overlap with available claims of
negligence.
This Article attempts to push the inquiry further. The Article
commences with a survey of a client's action based on a theory of
negligence. Through developments during the past four decades,
American courts now universally accept negligence as the customary
and broad foundation justifying a client's recovery for a lawyer's nonintentional harm. The Article then canvasses the conventional view of
the Restatement, other commentary, and contemporary case law
embracing the concept that an alternative or additional pathway to such
legal-malpractice relief exists by way of a fiduciary breach claim. It
turns out that the decisions reflect three different fiduciary breach
themes, only one of which is the central focus of my critique.
One view of fiduciary breach doctrine (and the one now arguably
ensconced in the Restatement) is that it stands as a companion theory to
negligence, to the extent that a fiduciary breach claim is equally
applicable to a single set of facts giving rise to a claim for negligence (or

17. For a prominent example, the Duncan article claims that courts routinely hold that
fiduciary breach claims against lawyers, unlike negligence claims, do not require proof of causation
or actual damages. Duncan, supra note 2, at 1155. However, while scattered and aberrant decisions
(including, arguably, a decision of the Second Circuit analyzed below, see infra text and
accompanying note 108) might suggest a lesser requirement of such a showing, the decisions very
dominantly agree that a fiduciary breach plaintiff must make the same showings of duty, breach,
causation, and damages as would be true if the same claim were brought as a negligence claim. See
infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. Professor Duncan might have had in mind certain
equitable remedies such as fee-disgorgement, which have a history and substantive rules readily
distinguishable from the use of the fiduciary breach theory to recover compensatory damages. See
infra Part III.A.
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at least in some of them), a view I will call the "equal-claims"
application of fiduciary breach theory. It is that use of the general
fiduciary breach concept that I critique here. Other uses of the concept
should be sharply distinguished. Most prominently, fiduciary theory is
also deployed in decisions to justify and describe use of particular
remedies (for the most part what formerly would be identified as
equitable remedies) such as fee disgorgement and imposition of a
constructive trust. I refer to this as the "equitable remedies" application
of fiduciary breach theory.
The Article then moves to a general critique of the fiduciary breach
theory, recommending that it be eliminated in those instances,
apparently the great majority of its use in legal-malpractice litigation, in
which it simply restates in other words what could also be described as
professional negligence. If that view were to become the law in a
jurisdiction, the fiduciary breach claim would no longer provide a
generally available basis for liability, functioning as just another way to
say "negligence." At the same time, fiduciary theory would continue its
traditional role in the form of equitable remedies.
In addition, nothing in the proposed reworking of fiduciary breach
doctrine would detract in any way from the heuristic value of the term
"fiduciary" as a general, but powerful, statement of the commitment of
courts to protect clients through the maintenance of effective remedies
against lawyers who impose upon their clients or otherwise cause clients
harm by serious wrongdoing against them. Thus, I also urge that the
theory of lawyer-as-fiduciary be generally recognized as a key way of
describing the entire lawyer-client relationship and the duties that flow
from it, even if it would not be relied upon regularly as the standard by
which to measure lawyers' liability. In the course of that discussion, I
urge that courts continue (as they often do now) to use the "fiduciary"
concept to describe all of a lawyer's duties to a client, and not only those
few that are currently recognized as viable fiduciary breach settings.
Apart from clients' claims of fiduciary breach, I leave aside in the
discussion that follows several possible bases of lawyer liability to
clients. Thus excluded from consideration are theories of breach of
contract, violation of statutory duty, and intentional wrongdoing, such as
fraud. Also excluded from consideration, of course, are such uses of the
fiduciary breach concept as the cause of action by a non-client against a
lawyer based on the lawyer's alleged wrongful aiding and abetting of a
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client's breach of fiduciary duties to the third party. 18 The breach of
contract theory is based on the lawyer's asserted breach of an express or
implied promise to the client to perform in a certain way or breach of a
warranty concerning the outcome, claims that should rarely succeed
(because lawyers only rarely make such promises or warranties). 19 A
claim of lawyer liability to a client based on a statutory violation is more
commonly encountered, but, quite unlike the fiduciary breach claim, is
based on a court's perception either that a statute provides an
independent basis for relief or that awarding relief to the client in a civil
action furthers the specific legislative policy that generated the statutory
duty in question. 20 Lawyer liability for intentional wrongs applies the
general duty of tort law to compensate a client for a lawyer's intentional
and wrongful infliction of harm. That is an instance of application of the
general law to lawyers and has generated little controversy.2 ' As I will
note in conclusion, the contract-based theory of recovery (but not the
other indicated bases of recovery) may well be subject to much the same
analysis as that applied here to what I term the equal-claim version of
the fiduciary breach theory in instances where there is no evidence of a
specific promise by the lawyer that implies anything more than what the
general duty of care already imposes.

18. See, e.g., Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406
(3d Cir. 2003); Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999); Chem-Age Indus., Inc. v. Glover,
652 N.W.2d 756, 774-77 (S.D. 2002) (citing extensive authority). See generally RESTATEMENT,
supra note 4, § 51(4). On the possibility of a finding that a lawyer owes fiduciary (or fiduciary-like)
duties to a non-client, see, for example Russell v. Lundberg, 120 P.3d 541, 547 (Utah Ct. App.
2005) (holding that, while a law firm acting as mortgage trustee in a foreclosure action did not owe
a fiduciary duty to homeowners, the law firm did owe obligations of reasonableness and good faith
in avoiding unlawful inflation of foreclosure costs).
19. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 48 cmt. c. Distinct from that limited use of
the breach of contract theory, some decisions more broadly permit a legal-malpractice plaintiff to
plead that the lawyer's failure to exercise due care breached an implied contractual undertaking of
the lawyer. See generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.7
(2005 ed.) (discussing decisions in several jurisdictions allowing multiplicity of theories through
recognizing implied-contract claim). Even more expansively, one court has intimated that it views
the entire legal-malpractice claim (including such a claim based on a pleaded theory of negligence)
as essentially contractual, and thus not subject to a contributory-negligence defense. See Jackson
State Bank v. King, 844 P.2d 1093, 1095-96 (Wyo. 1993). The last is, however, a distinctly
minority view, both on its theory and on its specific holding. See 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra, § 21.2
(discussing availability of contributory negligence as defense to claim of breach of fiduciary duty).
All states, except Wyoming, recognize contributory and comparative negligence defenses in legalmalpractice litigation. Id.
20. See generally RESTATEMENT, supranote 4, § 52 cmt. f.
21. See generally id. § 56.
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MEASURING A LAWYER'S CHALLENGED CONDUCT: A CLIENT'S
NEGLIGENCE ACTION

Three or four decades ago, lawyers were among the last of
American professionals that needed to confront the realistic threat of a
professional malpractice action by a disgruntled client, an attempt to
recover damages or other relief for harm alleged to have been caused by
the lawyer's wrongful action or inaction during the course of a
representation. 22 The expansion of legal-malpractice exposure of lawyers
that began at that point soon reached historically high levels that have
continued until the present day.23 The reason for the long earlier period
of relatively infrequent legal-malpractice claims has not been elaborately
explored. The absence of claims was probably not a product of a
judiciary that was more markedly hostile to legal-malpractice claims
than other types of professional claims; the evolving law of legal
malpractice had generally kept pace with the law of professional
negligence as applied to other professionals, even while the legalmalpractice filings lagged far behind other professions, such as the
medical profession.24
The customary explanation for the traditional lack of legalmalpractice filings was the much-mooted "conspiracy of silence," by
force of which lawyers would refuse to assist a client in the client's
potential legal-malpractice claim.25 Any notion that lawyers consciously
conspired in this way seems far-fetched. More likely, lawyers' refusing
to sue each other was a result of indirect, but nonetheless powerful,
22. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics-l
The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 214-16 (2002) (noting a surge of legal malpractice
actions against lawyers, beginning in the 1960s, following decades of significantly (and
consistently) lower levels of reported decisions); see also, e.g., John M. Bauman, Damages for
Legal Malpractice:An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEMP. L.
REv. 1127, 1128 (1988) (noting a great increase in medical-malpractice litigation, followed, in
some years, by a corresponding increase in legal malpractice lawsuits).
23. On the continuing level of such claims, see, for example, ABA STANDING COMM. ON
PROF'L LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2000-2003 (2005), reported in
Malpractice: ABA Committee MalpracticeReport Reveals Slight Rise in Severe Claims, 21 Laws.
Man. on Prof l Conduct (ABA/BNA) 459 (Sept. 7, 2005) (reporting release of ABA study
indicating that frequency and rate of legal-malpractice claims have been generally constant over last
eighteen years); 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 1.6 (noting that a climb in the relative
number of malpractice decisions "began in the 1960's with a dramatic and steady increase in the
frequency of legal malpractice litigation. Today, in the new millennium, the absolute number of
appellate decisions is still increasing, as is the relative frequency").
24. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 5.6.1 (1986) (stating that the
basic doctrinal content of legal malpractice law has remained intact for decades prior to the mid-

1980s).
25.

See, e.g., id. § 5.6.
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assumptions and understandings embedded in the common culture of
lawyers of that day. In any event and for whatever reason, most lawyers
refused to serve as plaintiffs counsel in a client's lawsuit against
another lawyer
or as the second lawyer giving expert testimony for the
26
plaintiff.
Clearly, that epoch is now long since over, and today it seems
unlikely to return. Aggrieved clients no longer lack lawyer champions. A
lawyer's filing suit against another lawyer on behalf of a legalmalpractice claimant is hardly stigmatized today or even significantly
noticed, at least in most larger legal communities. A few lawyers have
made a handsome living as specialists in this law-practice niche.
Lawyers are also readily available to serve as an expert witness for
plaintiffs in such suits.
The lawyer-objects of legal-malpractice claims are as diverse as the
legal profession itself. The slowly dying legend among lawyers
(particularly large-firm lawyers and lawyer-academics) is that the
bumbling lawyers who typically become entoiled in legal-malpractice
actions are over-taxed or poorly organized solo practitioners and lawyers
in small firms.27 But large law firms today are hardly immune from
exposure to legal-malpractice claims, including some of breath-taking
magnitude. As a result, it is typical to find large firms carrying multiple
layers of legal-malpractice insurance coverage, with the upper layers
approaching or exceeding $100 million in total coverage for the most
heavily insured firms.28
The doctrinal glue that holds that litigational enterprise together and
tests a client's right to recover is the branch of the law of non-intentional
economic injury commonly referred to as legal malpractice. Legal
malpractice basically, and in many details, embodies the now traditional

26. On the general obligation that a legal-malpractice plaintiff supports the claim with expert
testimony, see infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. Then, as now, the same lawyer could not
serve as both advocate and expert witness because of the so-called "advocate-witness" rule, which
prohibited (and continues to prohibit) such a dual role. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4,
§ 108(l)(a).
27.

See, e.g., Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: No Lawyer or Client is Safe, 47 FLA. L.

REv. 1,40-43 (1995) (providing statistics and refuting assumptions that solo and small-firm lawyers
are at greater risk for liability).
28. For largely anecdotal accounts of the extent of large-firm coverage, see Nicole A. Cunitz,
Note, Mandatory MalpracticeInsurancefor Lawyers: Is There a Possibility of Public Protection

Without Compulsion?, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 642-45 (1995). Inevitably, the subject of
"insurance" for legal malpractice raises the hackles of many insurers, as well as lawyers and law
firms, for fear that knowledge about its terms and extent of coverage-even publicizing the possible
existence of such insurance-will only encourage unwarranted filing of "nuisance" suits against
lawyers. Id. at 652-54.
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professional negligence claim in this instance, liability for failure to
conduct oneself as would a lawyer of ordinary care and prudence in the
same or similar circumstances.29 While there was considerable doubt
about the matter until recent decades,3 ° it has now become quite well
settled-apparently in every jurisdiction-that, except in rare cases
where breach of duty is either admitted by the defending lawyer or
clearly established on the record, 3' the client is required to prove the
element of breach of duty through the testimony of one or more expert
witnesses. 32 Beyond proving duty and its breach, the client must also
successfully carry the burden of proving causation and resulting
damages.33 The required showing of causation is described quite
differently in many jurisdictions. Several states impose a strict test. In
New York, California, and other jurisdictions the client must prove "but
for" causation, that, but for the professional negligence of the defending
lawyer, the client would have been measurably better off.3 4 Other
29. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52(1) ("a lawyer who owes a duty of care
must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar
circumstances"). That legal malpractice is founded on negligence is rarely questioned, although
arguably contrary (and aberrant) decisions can be found. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Bean, 556 S.E.2d
741, 743 (Va. 2002) (holding that, because legal malpractice is essentially a contract claim, punitive
damages are not recoverable under tort concepts).
30. See generally Martin T. Fletcher, Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND.
L.J. 771, 779 (1968) (noting that the majority of the (relatively few) legal-malpractice decisions on
the books in 1968 took the position that expert testimony was not required).
31. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52 cmt. g (stating that "expert testimony is
unnecessary when it would be plain to a nonlawyer or is established as a matter of law that the
lawyer's acts constitute negligence..."). See, e.g., Vandermay v. Clayton, 984 P.2d 272 (Or. 1999);
House v. Maddox, 360 N.E.2d 580 (111.App. Ct. 1977) (expert testimony was not required where
evidence clearly established that lawyer had not filed a claim within the time allowed by the statute
of limitations).
32. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52 cmt. g (stating the general rule that "a plaintiff
alleging professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty ordinarily must introduce expert
testimony concerning the care reasonably required in the circumstances of the case and the lawyer's
failure to exercise such care"); Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of
Expert Evidence as to Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against
Attorney, 14 A.L.R. 4th 170 (1982) (illustrating the extent to which contemporary decisions broadly
agree that expert testimony is normally required).
33. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 53 (stating that a lawyer is liable for
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty "only if the lawyer's breach of a duty of care or breach of
fiduciary duty was a legal cause of injury, as determined under generally applicable principles of
causation and damages"). Unlike the issue of breach of duty, see infra note 101, jurisdictions
generally do not require that proof of proximate cause be supported by expert testimony. See, e.g.,
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Benham, 423 F.3d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding so under Arkansas
law).
34. See, e.g., Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1051-52 (Cal. 2003) (reversing the intermediate
appellate court and holding that "but for" causation is mandatory in transactional-malpractice as
well as litigation-malpractice settings); Estate of Re v. Komstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F.Supp. 907,
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jurisdictions, apparently a majority, test causation by a markedly more
lenient standard, requiring the client to prove (only) that the professional
negligence of the defending lawyer was a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiff-client's loss, even if not a necessary cause.35
The scope of the grounds that a client might invoke to prove breach
of duty in a negligence claim is vast, encompassing most of the duties of
lawyers spelled out in the lawyer codes and as generally understood and
practiced by those mythical lawyers of ordinary care and prudence
whose activities supposedly set the standard for negligence.36 The theory
obviously includes all such carelessness as failing to file a client's claim
within the applicable statute of limitations,3 7 failing to conduct
appropriate legal research 38 or factual investigation, 39 and failing to
920 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing New York authority); see also FDIC v. Ferguson, 982 F.2d 404, 406
(10th Cir. 1991) (holding that "but for" causation was required in negligence under Oklahoma law).
But see, e.g., Vahila v. Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1168-69 (Ohio 1997) (refusing to insist that in every
case the client must prove a "case-within-a-case" to make out causation in a so-called "lost
opportunity" setting). See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 41 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the extent to which "but for" causation standard prevails). Litigators
differ among themselves over the extent to which, assuming that a claim is sufficiently supported
with evidence to take the case to the jury on duty, breach, and damages issues, the element of
proximate causation is nonetheless likely to prove to be a significant stumbling block if a good
defensive case can be made out. For many defense lawyers, the common wisdom is that, if
proximate cause in a legal-malpractice case is the only significant defense issue, the case should be
settled, not tried.
35. See, e.g., 2175 Lemoine Ave. Corp. v. Finco, Inc., 640 A.2d 346, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994) (holding that the test of proximate cause in a lawyer-negligence case "is satisfied
where the negligent conduct is a substantial contributing factor in causing the [client's] loss"). See
generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000); KEETON ET AL., supra note 34.

36. Some idea of the scope of negligence claims can be gleaned quickly from scanning the
volumes of the most well-known of the legal-malpractice treatises. See generally MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 19.
37. Id. § 30.17. (discussing "missed statute of limitations" as a ground for malpractice
recovery); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Legal Malpractice by Permitting Statutory Time
Limitation to Run Against Client's Claim, 90 A.L.R. 3d 293 (1979).
38. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the trial court
properly instructed the jury that "an attorney does not ordinarily guarantee the soundness of his
opinions and, accordingly, is not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice. He is
expected, however, to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law which are
commonly known by well informed attorneys, and to discover those additional rules of law which,
although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research techniques."); cf., e.g.,
Procanik v. Cillo, 502 A.2d 94, 95-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (noting that on these facts, it
was an issue for the jury whether a medical-malpractice specialist breached the duty of care by
failing to notify the client of changes in the law created by a decision of the state's supreme court
that became public only a short time prior to the expiration of the applicable limitations period).
39. A frequently-cited decision is Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686,
693-94 (Minn. 1980) (discussing a lawyer's liability for failure to research the question whether a
potential medical-malpractice physician used due care). See generally 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra
note 19, § 30.27 (discussing liability for errors in "investigation and evaluation").
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secure a client's objectives through shoddy document-preparation or
similarly defective transactional work.4 °
Most importantly for present purposes, the negligence theory is
routinely employed to permit plaintiff clients to recover on claims that
lawyers caused harm because of a wrongful conflict of interest.41 Such
claims are noteworthy here because they are the same claims that courts
in many jurisdictions permit a client to assert on an equal-claims basis as
a breach of fiduciary duty.42 In most jurisdictions, the opinions suggest
that the fiduciary breach theory is limited to those relatively few claims,
and that it is not to serve as an alternative to negligence in all instances.43
In short, the areas of allowable client recovery through the negligence
action encompass almost all (but not quite all44 ) claims that courts also
allow clients to assert under the fiduciary breach theory. However, there
are many claims that are routinely asserted as negligence claims that
cannot be asserted as breaches of fiduciary duty, a matter explored
further below.4 5
It would vastly overstate the resulting state of affairs to leave an
impression that the negligence action for legal malpractice is widely
celebrated for the clarity of its doctrine, the ease and certainty of its
application, and its ability to lead to just and fair outcomes that are
readily predictable. As with most areas of litigation, controversy and
imperfections afflict the negligence claim. Nonetheless, as one arguably
important measure of its success as doctrine, the negligence action
seems to have become relatively well-accepted by lawyers (most of
whom are at least potentially subject to its exactions) as both a necessary
concomitant of professional practice and a relatively workable and fair
method of allocating the risks and consequences of lawyers' failures to
act competently in representing their clients. The success of the
negligence remedy might be less enthusiastically described from the
perspective of injured clients. Yet, at a minimum, clients may be assured
that most jurisdictions will treat as actionable negligence any claim that
40. See, e.g., Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C., 127 F.3d 175, 179-80 (1st Cir. 1997)
(applying Massachusetts law, and stating the duty of care of a lawyer in a real-estate transaction);
Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 2003) (discussing the application of the causation standard
to a client's action for transactional malpractice).
41. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 16.18. (surveying many decisions
invoking negligence as a basis for recovery against a lawyer for a conflicted representation).
42. See discussion infra Part IV and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, Ribicoff and Kotkin, 717
A.2d 724, 730 (Conn. 1998) (stating that "[p]rofessional negligence alone.., does not give rise
automatically to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty").
44. See infra notes 76-82, 97 and accompanying text.
45. See id.
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a lawyer caused harm to a client through a breach of almost all of the
provisions of the applicable lawyer code governing the lawyer's
conduct.46

III.

"EQUITABLE-REMEDIES" APPLICATIONS OF

FIDUCIARY BREACH LAW

Before turning to the much more problematic area of the "equalclaims" version of fiduciary breach, it is beneficial to explore briefly the
other principal way in which fiduciary theory has been applied to
lawyers. That area, which I have classified as "equitable-remedies"
applications of fiduciary breach law, is not subject to the same criticisms
that I will offer for equal-claims theory. At the very least, the two
equitable remedies that have most frequently been applied to lawyersfee forfeiture (or fee disgorgement, as the remedy is often called) and the
imposition of a constructive trust-have long histories and relatively
well worked-out doctrinal elements. While at least the fee-disgorgement
remedy has been subjected to some criticism (largely concerning the test
by which it is to be applied), and is itself in an apparent state of
transformation, there is broad agreement that some substantive body of
law should continue to recognize the remedy. There is also broad
agreement that each remedy, given its objectives and history,
legitimately calls for discrete substantive rules, which mark off those
remedies from attempted recovery under either the negligence theory or
the theory of fiduciary breach more generally.
A.

The Remedy of Fee Forfeiture

Reflecting the origins of the fiduciary breach theory in the flexible
and discretionary hands of traditional equity, perhaps the most
defensible difference between fiduciary breach claims and negligence
claims is the availability of additional kinds of remedies for a fiduciary
breach. In general, a negligence claim provides only compensation for
economic harm caused to the plaintiff-client. In contrast, remedies for
fiduciary breach claims are more numerous. As a prominent example,
the remedy of disgorgement of profits has long been recognized as a
46. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52 cmt. f. On the broad agreement among
jurisdictions that expert testimony in negligence cases may permissibly rely on provisions of the
applicable lawyer code (and often disclose such reliance to the jury), see id. cmt. g. But see, e.g.,
Hizey v. Carpenter, 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992) (holding that an expert could rely on lawyer codes
in giving testimony, but he or she should not mention such reliance in the presence of the jury).
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beneficiary's available remedy against a fiduciary, requiring the
fiduciary to disgorge to the beneficiary any profit that the fiduciary
wrongfully gained through the fiduciary's office.47 Generalizing that
view, the Restatement of Agency states flatly that a disloyal agent may
be required to disgorge payments made by the principal to the agent that
were tainted by the disloyalty.48 While disgorgement often involves
conscious wrongdoing, use of this remedy even when the fiduciary's
wrongdoing was non-deliberate might support the interest of deterring
breaches of fiduciary duty. For such reasons, the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers 49 as well as the Restatement of Restitution 50 both
approve of the use of the disgorgement remedy for unintentional breach
of fiduciary duty. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,
however, imposes additional requirements before the remedy of total
disgorgement of a lawyer's fee may be imposed. 1
Decisions have largely agreed with the Restatement views.52
Importantly, in doing so, courts have not required a client seeking fee
forfeiture to show that the lawyer's wrongful conduct caused the client

47. See generally I DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5(3) (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DOBBS, REMEDIES] (describing generally the remedy of disgorgement against trustee or

other fiduciary). In the specific context of impermissible lawyer business transactions with a client,
a result similar to disgorgement can sometimes be obtained through the remedy of rescission of the
underlying agreement between lawyer and client. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 6
cmt. e.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (1958) (stating that agent is entitled to no
compensation for conduct that is disobedient or breaches agent's duty of loyalty to principal).
49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 49 cmt. d ("Breaches of some fiduciary duties... typically
involve intentional conduct, in that the lawyer chooses to act knowing facts that make the act
improper. However, a lawyer who violates fiduciary duties to a client is subject to liability even if
the violation or the resulting harm was not intended.").
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c.
(Discussion Draft 2000).
51. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 37 cmts. d, e (scaling the extent of fee forfeiture to the
seriousness and obviousness of the lawyer's wrongful conduct as well as the extent that conduct
harms important client interests). For a decision generally following the approach of the
Restatement on fee forfeiture, see, for example, Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999). For a
criticism of the fee-disgorgement line of decisions, see generally Duncan, supra note 2.
52. Among leading decisions are Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying District of Columbia law, on the facts here, a lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty warranted
fee forfeiture despite an absence of a showing of actual financial harm); Searcy, Denney, Scarola,
Barnhart & Shipley, P.A. v. Scheller, 629 So. 2d 947, 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (following
Restatement); Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 237-45 (applying a multi-factor standard of the Restatement
to determine the extent of forfeiture of lawyer's fee and holding that the client need not show actual
harm, but only the extent of any harm relevant to extent of forfeiture). See also, e.g., Thomas D.
Morgan, Sanctions and Remedies for Attorney Misconduct, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 351 (1995)
("[Tihe fee forfeiture sanction is available even where a client has suffered no loss as a result of an
attorney's alleged misconduct.").
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harm, although the extent of any harm shown to have been caused is
relevant in determining the extent of forfeiture.5 3 Fee forfeiture, in the
absence of harm to the client, obviously provides a remedy with a
substantive element quite different. from what would otherwise be
available by means of an action for either negligence or fiduciary
breach. 4 However, a central purpose of the remedy of fee forfeiture is to
provide deterrence by depriving the lawyer of any gain related to the
wrongdoing and to protect the relationship of trust and confidence
between clients and lawyers," purposes whose salience does not depend
on whether the client was harmed. Accordingly, altering the substantive
element by relaxing the normally required showing of client harm is
eminently sound.
B. Imposition of a Constructive Trust
A similar alteration of some substantive requirements that are
normally found in negligence and fiduciary breach theories of recovery
can also be seen with the constructive-trust remedy. The remedy treats
the lawyer as the trustee of any funds or property obtained by the lawyer
in, for example, a business transaction with the client and requires the
lawyer to hold in trust and promptly return any property or funds
obtained from the client in the absence of a showing that the transaction
complied with exacting standards meant to assess whether the
transaction was fair and reasonable. 56 The remedy is well-established in
traditional equity.5 7 The large majority of decisions arising out of clientlawyer business transactions holds that the normal requirement imposed
on the plaintiff-client of showing that the business transaction was
wrongful is substantially altered because of the fiduciary obligations of
the lawyer. The lawyer, not the client, has the burden here of
demonstrating that the business transaction was fair and reasonable.58 As
some courts put it, such a business transaction is presumed fraudulent or

53. Id.
54. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 37 cmt. b; see also Burrow, 997 S.W.2d at 240-41.
56. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 126(2) (stating the requirement that "the
terms and circumstances of the [business transaction between lawyer and client] are fair and
reasonable to the client"); id. cmt. e. (discussing the fairness requirement).
57. See generally DOBBS, REMEDIES, supra note 47 (discussing older decisions on the
business-transaction rule).
58. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 126 cmt. a ("In any civil proceeding between a lawyer and
a client or their successors, the lawyer has the burden of persuading the tribunal that requirements
stated in this Section have been satisfied."); id., reporter's note to cmt. a.
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at least presumed to be voidable, unless the lawyer seeking to benefit
from it can prove the contrary. 9
As with fee forfeiture, the constructive-trust remedy follows
faithfully from a very focused rationale that is best served by altering the
normal burden of proving whether the transaction was fair and
reasonable. Unlike business contracts in general, such as between
business people or between business people and consumers, there is no
public policy served by encouraging client-lawyer business transactions
even if they might otherwise be lawful under general contract law. To
the contrary, the substantive law regulating such transactions between
fiduciary and principal clearly reflects suspicion, if not hostility, toward
such transactions. 60 The law in most states demands that, to be
enforceable, a client-lawyer business transaction must be fair and
reasonable and that the lawyer make an adequate disclosure to the client
that the lawyer's personal financial interest is in conflict with the
possible interest of the client in obtaining disinterested legal advice
about the transaction. 61 Moreover, the lawyer is typically in a superior
position to realize the conflict and to deal effectively with it. Given the
opportunity obviously provided by the lawyer's own general legal
experience and specific role in the transaction, little additional cost is
imposed on the parties, especially on the lawyer, by, in effect, requiring
the lawyer to document satisfaction of those requirements in the course
of otherwise documenting the transaction. If such adequate transaction
documents are prepared and signed, and if the facts support the situation
portrayed in the documents, in most instances, the lawyer can readily
carry the burden of showing fairness and reasonableness. If that
documentation is not generated, the burden is rightly imposed on the
person, the lawyer, who was in the best position to have anticipated and
obviated the need for such proof in a later evidentiary showing. That in
fact is what the law achieves by shifting the burden of proof to the
lawyer in order to avoid the remedy of constructive trust.

59. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 15.4 (discussing business-transaction
decisions); Tyson v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823 (Miss. 1992) (stating that a lawyer business
transaction with a client is "presumptively fraudulent"); Hughes v. McDaniel, 98 A.2d 1, 4 (Md.
1953) (ruling that a lawyer's business transaction with a client is "primafaciefraudulent and void");
In re Estate of Mapes, 738 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Mo. 1987) (holding, in a lawsuit challenging a
lawyer's receipt of a gift from a client, that the gift transaction was rebuttably presumed to be the
result of fraud and undue influence).
60. This is reflected in the approaches of some courts that characterize such contracts as
"presumptively fraudulent." See sources cited supra note 59.
61. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 126.
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As with the fee-forfeiture remedy, the extent to which the law of
the constructive-trust remedy alters the usual rules of negligence is both
focused and limited. It is also fully warranted by the specific rationale
for the remedy. The contrast with the other principal use of fiduciary
theory, that underlying the "equal-claims" version of fiduciary breach
law, is sharp.
IV.

THE "EQUAL-CLAIMS" VERSION OF THE
FIDUCIARY BREACH CONCEPT

In contrast to the reach of the negligence theory of legal
malpractice and the law defining the substantive elements of the
equitable-remedies claims, the "equal-claims" version of fiduciary
breach theory has always had about it the aura of an exception, a
departure from the norm of legal malpractice as negligence. Although
the number of filings of fiduciary breach claims against lawyers has
apparently increased in recent years, fiduciary breach law itself still
seems to be finding its way. In one sense, the lesser status of fiduciary
breach claims in the decided cases and the ascendancy of negligencebased recovery in most economic-harm litigation against lawyers might
seem anomalous as a matter of professional ideology, with its frequent
embrace of the ideal of lawyer-as-fiduciary. The reason for the
apparently confined and second-class status of fiduciary breach claims
must reflect rather strong judicial misgivings. As will be seen, there is
significant evidence of judicial reluctance to unleash fiduciary breach
doctrine farther because of its broad rhetorical sweep, its indeterminate
application as doctrine, its forensic volatility, and its overall potential to
extend lawyer liability far beyond what otherwise well-settled legalmalpractice theory and practice would support.
A.

Breach of FiduciaryDuty in General

Anglo-American law for centuries has recognized an equitable
ciaim for breach of duty on the part of a variety vf pcsvaois whum th
law denominates "fiduciaries. '6 2 The forerunners of such claims were
62. The general fiduciary breach theory, for example, as applied to trustees and similar
custodians of property that is to be managed by the fiduciary for the benefit of others (beneficiaries),
has roots running back centuries in decisions of courts of equity. See generally Robert Flannigan,
The Fiduciary Obligation,9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285 (1989); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary
Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975); L.S. Sealy, FiduciaryRelationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 69. Legal scholars seem to agree that it is otherwise unclear where and why the concept of
fiduciary breach arose as a matter of legal history and theory. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879; Tamar Frankel,
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recognized long before the development in the last century and a half of
the modem concept of professional negligence. 63 The fiduciary breach
claim entitled, and still entitles, a protected person (such as a beneficiary
of an express trust or a client), commonly referred to as the principal, to
recover against a person (such as a trustee or a lawyer), commonly
called the agent, for a violation of the duties of the fiduciary. Agents,
such as lawyers, who are subject to fiduciary duties are at least generally
identifiable as those persons who have undertaken to protect important
interests of the principal when the circumstances of the relationship
indicate that the principal is vulnerable to abuse by the agent because the
undertaking confers significant discretion on the agent and, hence,
power over the principal's property or other valuable interests. 64 That
concept has a long history in decisions finding a lawyer liable to a client
for fiduciary breach, and it remains the base of all such claims.

FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983) (writing about the history of the general theory of
liability for breach of fiduciary duty, and asserting: "Little has been written about the origin of
fiduciary law, the rationales behind the creation of fiduciary duties, the remedies for violations of
these duties, and the methods by which courts fashion such remedies.").
63. On the development of the concept of professional negligence in the nineteenth century,
see generally supra notes 34, 47 and accompanying text; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 350-51 (3d ed. 2005) (giving history of development of American law of torts
(negligence) beginning in latter half of nineteenth century); 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note
19, § 1.2 (tracing history of American legal malpractice law as on off-shoot of negligence law
which did not develop until the nineteenth century).
64. On the general theory of fiduciary obligation, see infra notes 76-82, 97 and accompanying
text. See also D. Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of FiduciaryDuty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and FiduciaryDuty, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 425, 435 (1993); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship. Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (1991). Although some
scholarship touches on the client-lawyer fiduciary duty as an example of the fiduciary breach genre,
most of the prior scholarly work focuses on fiduciary liability either generally or as applied to either
property holders (such as trustees and personal representatives of decedents' estates) or corporate
officers and directors.
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B. The Substantive Content of Fiduciary
Breach Claims Against
65
Lawyers
How does a client's attempted recovery for a lawyer's fiduciary
breach differ substantively from a claim for negligence? As will be seen,
it is clear that fiduciary breach doctrine lacks coherence and is far from
settled. Considered below are several important problematic aspects of
the doctrine.
1. Judicial and Professional Rhetoric Concerning the Lawyer-asFiduciary
The dominant, almost invariant, language that courts and bar
organizations employ in discussing the fiduciary breach claim is at the
same time compelling but very amorphous. It is also one of the most
popular, for tactical reasons, among others, for plaintiff-clients. 66 At an
intuitive and general level (where, unfortunately, the matter is often left),
the concept of lawyer liability for fiduciary breach has powerful
appeal.67 Who would quarrel, for example, with the broad and essential
proposition that a lawyer has the duty of acting with the highest "degree
of honesty, forthrightness, loyalty, and fidelity"? 68 In what is arguably a

sufficient sign by itself of amorphous rhetoric, several courts continue to

65. Among potentially significant differences between fiduciary breach claims and negligence
claims are those involving claims by non-clients against lawyers who represent others. Some
fiduciary breach claims can be asserted against lawyers by a non-client. Compare 2 MALLEN &
SMITH, supra note 19, § 14.3 (considering the extent of a lawyer's fiduciary duties to non-clients),
with I MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, §§ 7.1-7.15 (general prohibition against negligence-based
claims against lawyers by non-clients, with limited exceptions). Claims by a non-client might also
invoke the theory that the lawyer's actions constituted impermissible aiding and abetting of a client
fiduciary's breach of duty. See, e.g., Joel v. Weber, 197 A.D.2d 396, 396-97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)
(holding that plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded aiding and abetting in stating that the law firm
knowingly and recklessly assisted a fiduciary in diversion of the plaintiff's partnership distribution);
see also Stanley Pietrusiak, Jr., Comment, Changing the Nature of Corporate Representation:
Attorney Liabilityfor Aiding and Abetting the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 213

(1996). Both areas lie outside the focus of this Article.
66. On the tactical use of general descriptions of a lawyer's fiduciary duties in jury-tried
fiduciary breach cases, see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
67. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 16 & cmt. b (in section describing general
scope of "[A] Lawyer's Duties to a Client" stating, as rationale: "[a] lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a
person to whom another person's affairs are entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult
or undesirable for that other person to supervise closely the performance of the fiduciary.");
WOLFRAM, supranote 24, § 4.1 (discussing concept of lawyer as client fiduciary).
68. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Smyrna Dev., Inc. v.
Bomstein, 177 So. 2d 16, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)).
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insist69on describing the fiduciary duty of lawyers in Latin-uberrima
fides.
The rhetoric of lawyer-as-fiduciary flows naturally, indeed,
ineluctably, from the rhetoric of "fiduciary" in general. The mandatory
citation or quotation in judicial opinions discussing the general fiduciary
concept is Cardozo's stirring and much-quoted words in Meinhard v.
Salmon,70 which dealt with joint venturers inter se, not lawyers and their
clients:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the
enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's
length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held
to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the
attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of
undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular
exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept
at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
It will not consciously
71
be lowered by any judgment of this court.
Clear echoes of Justice Cardozo's paean to the fiduciary concept
can be found in many opinions repeating the fiduciary breach standard
as applied to lawyers.7 2 Perhaps attracted by Cardozo's overblown
rhetoric, some of those courts have attempted to equal his poetic
language (if not his strained syntax). Among the more artful is the
following, from an intermediate appellate court opinion in Texas, which

69. David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that "[t]he relation between attorney and client is a fiduciary relation of the very highest
character, and binds the attorney to most conscientious fidelity-uberrimafides") (quotations
omitted). In a footnote, the court quoted with apparent approval the following definition of
uberrimafidesfrom Black's Law Dictionary: "[tihe most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect
candor or openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment [or] deception, however slight."
Id. at 341 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1690 (4th ed. 1968)).

70. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
71. Id. (citation omitted).
72. Matza v. Matza, 627 A.2d 414, 423 (Conn. 1993) (stating that "[t]he relationship between
an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting, and
confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith") (quotations omitted);
Tante v. Herring, 439 S.E.2d 5, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (stating, among other things, that the
fiduciary duties of a lawyer entailed "applying his best skill, zeal, and diligence... [and]
exercis[ing] the utmost good faith and loyalty... and [acting] solely for [the client's] benefit").
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(for readily understandable reasons) Texas malpractice plaintiffs'
lawyers strenuously attempt to have incorporated into jury instructions.
[T]he relationship between attorney and client has been described as
one of uberrima fides, which means "most abundant good faith,"
and honesty, and the
requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness
73
absence of any concealment or deception.
As a general concept, the high-sounding expressions of the
fiduciary concept perhaps provide courts with emotive phrases to
describe a kind of low-resolution photo of desired lawyer conduct as
well as a somewhat blurry vision of client vulnerability and trust. That
much, most lawyers would readily grant: clients are properly regarded as
the objects of the care of lawyer-fiduciaries. In particular cases, the
general language might also signal a court's outrage at peculiarly
egregious or unprofessional lawyer behavior, perhaps as a warning to
other lawyers who might encounter the court's opinion.
Much more positively, and importantly, there can be little doubt
that courts intend the lawyer-fiduciary rhetoric to serve a hopefully
powerful heuristic function. Courts clearly wish to impress upon lawyers
the urgency and importance of their duties to clients as well as warning
them that courts intend to assess sympathetically a client's claim of
fiduciary breach. That symbolic positioning of courts on the "side" of
clients is, however, curiously narrow if limited to the traditional
equitable grounds for claims of fiduciary breach. As has been seen,74
much of the realm of negligence liability lies beyond the reach of
fiduciary breach law, yet it would be strange to imagine that courts are
less concerned about the types of lawyer wrongdoing that are subject
only to a claim of negligence than they are about fiduciary breach claims
that (for largely historical reasons) parallel the reach of negligence.
Certainly from the perspective of clients, it would be difficult to
maintain that their interests, which are protected by the equal-claims
theory of fiduciary breach, are more important to them than, for
example, the competent handling of their entrusted matter, a claim that
can be asserted only through a negligence action.
For similar reasons, and perhaps for others, the lawyer-as-fiduciary
rhetoric has proved popular with official bar organs. Such rhetoric has an
obvious attraction because its highly moralistic resonance can be rallied
in support of the bar's position on issues that might threaten public
denunciation of lawyers and the bar. An example is a 1992 ABA formal
73. Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. App. 1991).
74. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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opinion stating that "[a] lawyer is bound to conduct himself as a
fiduciary or trustee occupying the highest position of trust and
confidence ....It is his duty to exercise and maintain the utmost good
faith, honesty, integrity, fairness and fidelity. ' 75 The linkage between
rhetoric and occasion is suggestive. The opinion held that a lawyer was
subject to professional discipline under the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for taking advantage of a client's vulnerability
through sexual relations with the client. Although the opinion did not
mention anything about lawyer liability for monetary damages, it can, of
course, be cited, for example by an expert witness for a plaintiff-client in
damages litigation as an expression of the bar's position on fiduciary
duties in the circumstances.
While it may be relatively harmless, indeed, quite beneficial for
important purposes, to express the fiduciary breach theory in general
language, it is another matter altogether to employ nothing more than
emotive, general language to describe a standard of liability. Beyond the
warm glow of generalities, there are difficult doctrinal and other
practical decisions to be made. Guidance in understanding and applying
the standards flowing from those generalities is needed by lower courts
in instructing juries, ruling on the relevance of evidence, and making
findings. Litigants need similar guidance to make sound decisions on
such critical matters as whether to file suit, to invest more or less
resources in prosecuting or defending the suit, and to settle a claim and,
if so, at what level. Those choices cannot be resolved by rhetoric alone,
unless one were to entertain the silly assumption that the rhetoric
uniformly compels a client-favoring outcome, regardless of the question.
Justice Frankfurter put it well in a decision attempting to ascertain the
appropriate "fiduciary" standard to be applied by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to officers and directors managing a holding
company that was in the process of reorganization.
We reject a lax view of fiduciary obligations and insist upon their
scrupulous observance. But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what
respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?
And what are the
76
consequences of his deviation from duty?

75. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992) (quoting
Hater v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974)).
76. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (citations omitted).
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Regrettably, however, few authorities have attempted such an
elaboration for fiduciary breach claims in legal-malpractice litigation,
even on the unambitious comparison to the degree to which the
negligence formulation of a lawyer's duties has been articulated.
Consequently, there is no general agreement about which lawyer
activities are included within the scope of fiduciary breach and which
are not, or about why included activities are not adequately addressed by
the theory of negligence. The authorities are redolent with the notion that
the fiduciary breach theory is more limited than the action for
negligence, but offer little meaningful guidance beyond that. Those
authorities that do attempt to elaborate on the reach of the equal-claims
theory offer different-and, frankly, overly simplified-formulations
from one part of a law review article to another," or one part or edition
of a treatise to another.78 The articulations of limited application of the
equal-claims concept are rarely defended, other than by an invocation of
precedent purporting to illustrate or simply to restate that application.79
77. Compare Duncan, supra note 2, at 1153 (stating that "[a] successful cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty arising from an attorney-client relationship requires proof that the lawyer
breached his duty of confidentiality or loyalty"), with id. at 1154 (stating that lawyer's fiduciary
obligations also include "safeguarding client property"). A different sort of problem infects other
analyses. For example, in Anderson & Steele, supra note 1, at 249, the authors offer the following
(unsupported) differentiation between negligence and fiduciary breach: "legal malpractice [that is,
negligence] contemplates a balancing of interests between attorney and client, a concept which the
law of fiduciary obligation definitely rejects." Yet, fiduciary breach cases reflect a similar
"balancing." For example, a lawyer who carries the burden of proving that a business transaction
with a client was fair and reasonable and followed a due disclosure is entitled to the benefit of the
bargain. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. At another point, the authors state that
"fiduciary obligations are sui generis and absolute, while the malpractice obligation of reasonable
care is only relative and fact specific." Anderson & Steele, supra note 1, at 268. Yet, it is
commonplace in fiduciary breach cases dealing with alleged conflicts of interest for the courts to
admit expert testimony on whether a lawyer of ordinary care and prudence would have recognized
the asserted conflict. In fact, most experts will testify as to both negligence and fiduciary breach in
such cases without differentiation.
78. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 14.2 ("The fiduciary obligations are twofold [only]:
(1) confidentiality; and (2) undivided loyalty."). The sole authority offered in support is a citation to
Richter v. Van Amberg, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (D. N.M. 2000), which is accurately described
in the treatise as "citing text." 2 MALLEN & SMITH § 14.2 & n.6. The only support mentioned in the
Richter opinion is a citation to an earlier edition of MALLEN & SMITH (2 MALLEN & SMITH § 14.1.5
(4th ed. 1998 Supp.)). The circularity of citation lends little support to the proposition.
In a closely related portion of the text, the Richter opinion cites Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah App. 1996). Kilpatrick, in turn, cites a yet earlier edition of
MALLEN & SMITH (I MALLEN & SMITH, § 11.1 (3d ed. 1989)), but that earlier version of the treatise
included the following, much more expansive definition of fiduciary duty, which includes a duty of
disclosure: lawyers have a legal duty "to represent the client with undivided loyalty, to preserve the
client's confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing upon the representation [of the
client]." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1290 (quoting 1 MALLEN & SMITH § 11.1 (3rd ed. 1989)).
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2. "Conduct" versus "Care"
One of the commonly stated "standards" of equal-claims fiduciary
law is a statement-almost invariably without any elaboration-found in
a surprising number of decisions and commentary. The statement is that,
while negligence involves the breach of a standard of "care," fiduciary
breach claims involve breach of a standard of "conduct., 80 Most of the
decisions claiming to adopt that differentiation in the last decade rely on
either a law review article 8' or a standard legal-malpractice treatise,
which the law review article cited as its principal authority. How the
care-versus-conduct differentiation might be justified or how it might
operate helpfully is left entirely unexplained. The asserted differentiation
is hardly intuitive. Indeed, the usage stands ordinary, intelligent use of
English on its head. "Conduct," the term used to describe the narrower
realm of fiduciary breach, is a term that is certainly broader in ordinary
meaning than, and could readily encompass, the concept of "care," the
negligence standard that governs a much vaster realm of lawyer activity.
Nor could it be that the care-conduct distinction is a veiled allusion to a
well worked-out dichotomy in arguably analogous areas of the law, such
as those concerning the fiduciary duties of partners or corporate
managers. In those areas as well, controversy rages about the existence
and extent of fiduciary duties of care. 83

80. A frequently-cited source of the distinction is Anderson & Steele, supra note 1, at 249
("[tihe essence of an action for malpractice is violation of a standard of care. A breach of fiduciary
duty, however, involves violation of a standard of conduct, not a standard of care"). On apparently
approving citations to the Anderson-Steele dichotomy, see, for example Duncan, supra note 2, at
1152; Latto, supra note 5, at 729-31. Fiduciary breach decisions have also recited the conduct-care
dichotomy approvingly, although also without noting how it aids resolution of the point being
decided. See, e.g., Richter, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (stating that "[1]egal malpractice based on
negligence concerns violations of the standard of care; whereas legal malpractice based upon breach
of (fiduciary] duty concerns violations of a standard of conduct"); Kilpatrick,909 P.2d at 1290. Cf.,
e.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz and Schatz, Ribicoff and Kotkin, 717 A.2d 724, 730
(Conn. 1998) ("Professional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary duty
implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.").
81. See generally Anderson & Steele, supranote 1.
82. The Anderson-Steele article cited to an earlier edition of Mallen & Smith's treatise. For
the current mention in MALLEN & SMITH of the care-conduct dichotomy, see 2 MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 19 § 14.2 (stating that "[tihe fiduciary obligations set a standard of 'conduct,' analogous
to the standard of 'care,' which pertains to the requisite skill, knowledge and diligence. Thus the
standard of care concerns negligence and the standard of conduct concerns a breach of loyalty or
confidentiality.") (footnotes omitted).
83. William A. Gregory, The FiduciaryDuty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 181 (2005) (including a somewhat polemical and critical discussion by a legal scholar of the
extensively-used description in corporate and partnership law, including statutory law, of a
"fiduciary duty of care").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:689

Beyond indeterminacy, one might also be concerned (particularly
when the reference to conduct-based standards is accompanied by
moralistic rhetoric about breach of fiduciary duty) that courts
emphasizing "conduct" might be entertaining the notion that the
fiduciary breach standard purposefully amounts to little more articulate
than an individual judge's conclusory expression of moral outrage, a
literal, latter-day realization of the old adage that equity was to be
measured by the chancellor's foot. That is not to say that breach of
fiduciary duty, as a general legal concept, should be thought to have
nothing to do with morality, contrary to the apparent claim of some
analysts attempting to forge a judicial legal agenda founded mainly, or
perhaps entirely, on contractarian concepts. For example, in their
seminal article on fiduciary duty in general,84 Frank Easterbrook and
Daniel Fischel have argued that fiduciary duties are an instance of courts
resolving Ronald Coase's problem of social costs. 85 They argue
persuasively in justifying the concept of fiduciary duties that "legal rules
can promote the benefits of contractual endeavors in a world of scarce
information and high transactions costs by prescribing the outcomes the
parties themselves would have reached had information been plentiful
and negotiations costless., 86 From this, however, they deduce that
"[f]iduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing;
they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same
way, as other contractual undertakings., 87 While the social-cost
argument in support of fiduciary duty claims is surely compelling as far
as it goes, why does it preclude the thought that moral considerations
might support the same doctrine, and perhaps extend it in morally
compelling instances? 88 Courts surely do not understand fiduciary
concepts in such a limiting way, most assuredly not in decisions finding
that a lawyer has violated a fiduciary duty to a client.
It remains, however, to descend from the lofty plane of moral and
other general considerations to the pedestrian, but vital, realm of
84. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64.
85. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
86. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 64, at 426.
87. Id. at 427 (emphasis added). An argument has been advanced by Gregory Alexander that
would arguably lead to a quite different understanding of fiduciary duties than that favored by
social-cost theorists. His proposed thesis is that "[c]ognitive factors lead courts to analyze fiduciary
relationships, at least those that are property-based, differently than they evaluate contractual
relationships." Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of FiduciaryRelationships, 85 CORNELL
L. REv. 767, 768 (2000) (footnote omitted).
88. 1 reject, of course, the possibility that practitioners of the Chicago School of economics
feel bound in their theorizing to follow the "duplicitous pleading" rule of the Illinois intermediate
appellate courts, which will shortly be considered. See infra notes 126 and accompanying text.
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attempting to construct sensible doctrine. Two approaches that are often
advanced in many areas of the law in attempts to articulate doctrine are
an analysis of policy and teasing-out coherent doctrine from the
decisions of individual cases. Unfortunately, pursuit of those approaches
in the case of equal-claims fiduciary theory does not lead very far in any
certain direction.
3. The Policy Implications of Fiduciary Breach Rhetoric
As a matter of policy, in fact, the clearly more limited reach of the
equal-claims fiduciary breach standard is peculiar. Clearly, the notion
behind equal-claims (as well as other) uses of fiduciary breach theory in
the case of lawyers is that certain duties of a lawyer to a client are
particularly important in terms of the client's own interests and wishes,
and are thus denominated "fiduciary" in nature. In that view of policy, it
would be perverse not to count as of at least equal importance the nature
of the lawyer's actual performance of functions in carrying out the
representation. Put another way, all of the realms of both "care" as well
as "conduct" would be swept into fiduciary breach doctrine. That has
indeed been done in some instances. For such reasons, in describing in
very general terms the duties of a lawyer to a client, the Restatement
takes an appropriately broad view and emphasizes the concept of
lawyer-as-fiduciary as the underpinning
of a lawyer's duties to act with
89
reasonable competence and diligence.
Yet, a conflation of all of a lawyer's duties to a client as fiduciary
makes the resulting policy a useless concept to wield in attempting to
determine which legal malpractice claims are subject to the equal-claims
89. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 16(2) (stating that lawyer must "act with reasonable
competence and diligence"); see also id. § 16(3) (stating lawyer's duties to "comply with
obligations concerning the client's confidences and property, avoid impermissible conflicting
interests, deal honestly with the client, and not employ advantages arising from the client-lawyer
relationship in a manner adverse to the client"). In explaining the rationale of the section, the
comments emphasize the fiduciary nature of the client-lawyer relationship. Id. § 16 cmt. b (stating,
as "[r]ationale" for the duties listed in the section: "A lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to
whom another person's affairs are entrusted in circumstances that often make it difficult or
undesirable for that other person to supervise closely the performance of the fiduciary."); see also,
e.g., Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that the trial court
acted properly in giving instruction on the negligence standard of care and refising to give
plaintiff's requested additional instruction on the fiduciary duty of a lawyer to exercise skill, stating
that "[e]xisting within the [negligence] standard, and comprising a component thereof, is the
fiduciary duty of the lawyer to the client. That duty does not create a special standard, but sets the
standard of performance on a level where conscientious endeavor is expected of ordinary men. The
exercise of trust responsibility by the attorney is a part of his work which makes diligence and
constancy in the handling of a client's concerns an element to be reasonably expected of ordinary
lawyers as a matter of course.").
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use of fiduciary breach and which are not. Under a policy that broad, all
of a lawyer's duties are essentially fiduciary. Yet that is not how the
equal-claims concept is understood. That concept is much narrower.
4.

The Decisions: The Fiduciary Breach Theory as
Workaday Doctrine
If one were to start afresh to construct the elements of an equalclaims fiduciary breach theory of recovery, one possibility would be to
infer a standard from the underlying factual settings in which fiduciary
breach claims have been upheld. Reading the decisions, it is quite
apparent that some factual settings are considered eligible for equalclaims fiduciary-treatment while others are not. However, from those
settings it is impossible to formulate a consistent and limited standard by
which to apply fiduciary breach doctrine, nor is it possible to derive any
conception of why it is that fiduciary breach claims are allowed to
operate in factual settings in which the better-understood and betterarticulated theory of negligence is also readily available.
The broadest area of agreement among decisions and writers is that
fiduciary breach theory includes claims that a lawyer represented clients
in violation of prohibitions against conflicts of interest. 90 And, to be
sure, the great majority of fiduciary breach claims upheld by courts bring
changes on a lawyer's conflicted representation of the client.9 1 Inclusion
of conflicts violations among allowable fiduciary breaches is often
explained on the basis that the lawyer has violated a duty of "loyalty" to
a client. 92 However, although courts occasionally suggest that only
loyalty offenses are included within the concept of fiduciary breach, 93 it
is clear that many authorities have additional categories in mind in
which a plaintiff-client might also assert fiduciary breach claims,
categories transcending what can meaningfully be described as a
problem of loyalty.

90.

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.

91.

E.g., Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989); Dessel v. Dessel, 431

N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 1988).

92. E.g., Tyson v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823 (Miss. 1992) (stating that a lawyer's fiduciary
duty of loyalty "may take one of two forms. The first involves situations in which the attorney
obtains an unfair personal advantage, such as acquiring property from a client; the second involves
situations in which the attorney or other clients have interests adverse to the client in question.").
93. E.g., Owen v. Pringle, 621 So. 2d 668, 671 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Hickox v. Holleman,
502 So. 2d 626, 633 (Miss 1987) (stating that "[t]oday a lawyer owes his client duties falling into
three broad categories: (a) the duty of care, (b) a duty of loyalty, and (c) duties provided by
contract")).
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A second area of fiduciary breach that courts frequently recognize
is a lawyer's misuse of the "confidences" of a client. Such decisions
concern two types of inappropriate lawyer conduct, which are connected
only by their coincidental use of two fundamentally different meanings
of the term. First is a lawyer's misuse of a client's secret information,
such as in preempting an investment or other economic opportunity
about which the client had consulted the lawyer, 94 or misusing one
client's information to advance the interests of another of the lawyer's
clients at the expense of the first. 95 That area is concerned with
protecting a client's confidences in the sense of confidential information
as broadly defined in the client-lawyer relationship. An entirely different
notion, using an entirely different meaning of "confidence" of a client,
condemns a lawyer's abuse of the trust that a client has bestowed on a
lawyer, such as by overreaching the client in a business transaction,96 or
inducing the client to have sex with the lawyer. 97 That concerns the
concept of the "trust and confidence" that a client confides in a lawyer.
That the foregoing "loyalty" and "confidences" offenses rightly
give rise to liability is clear. What is murky is why the theory of
fiduciary breach is necessary or even appropriate to reach that
conclusion and, if so, why the theory is exhausted by considering only
those grounds. As noted earlier, ample authority exists for the
proposition that the negligence theory reaches most of the area of lawyer
misconduct traditionally included within the fiduciary breach ambit, and
certainly includes conflicts.98
94. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 60(2) & cmt. j (stating the prohibition against a
lawyer's unconsented use of confidential information of a client for the lawyer's personal
enrichment); e.g., Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265
Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a claim that a law firm used confidential client
information to acquire property that the client was negotiating to purchase stated a triable claim of a
breach of fiduciary duty); David Welch Co. v. Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (affirming imposition of a constructive trust and ordering that a law firm disgorge profits
where the law firm employed confidential information gained in representing the client collection
agency to set up a competing entity and take business from the former client).
95. E.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 186 F.3d 1016, 1018-19 (8th Cir. 1999); Perez v. Kirk &
Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App. 1991).
96. E.g., Phillips v. Carson, 731 P.2d 820 (Kan. 1987); Goldman v. Kane, 329 N.E.2d 770
(Mass. App. Ct. 1975).
97. See generally Linda Mabus Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Fiduciary Theory Applied
to PersonalDealings: Attorney-Client Sexual Contact, 45 ARK. L. REV. 459 (1992); e.g., McDaniel
v. Gile, 281 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
98. E.g., Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 744 (7th Cir.
2004) (citations omitted) (in course of holding that a plaintiff-client's fiduciary breach claim must
be supported by expert testimony in the same way as a negligence claim, stating that "[a]n
attorney's throwing one client to the wolves to save the other is malpractice... whatever the
plaintiff chooses to call it."). Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see generally 2
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5. Fiduciary Breach and Negligence Doctrine Compared
Beyond the indeterminate nature of fiduciary breach liability of
lawyers, there is also uncertainty about the extent to which, if any, the
fiduciary breach tort might differ from the negligence tort. Some of
those possible differences are catalogued below. As will be seen, most of
the perceivable differences are not recognized in more than isolated
jurisdictions in which they have originated. At the end of the day, it
clearly appears that there are vast areas of congruence of the coverage of
negligence doctrine and that of the equal-claims version of fiduciary
breach. In fact, it well might be that the indeterminate nature of fiduciary
breach claims and the law underlying them lend themselves easily to
misunderstanding. As an initial instinct, even very smart lawyers can be
excused for thinking that there must be something different about
negligence claims and fiduciary breach claims when courts permit both
theories to be pleaded and proved in legal-malpractice cases.
a.

Proof of Duty and Breach: Expert Testimony

As a general proposition, a client seeking recovery under the
negligence theory must offer expert testimony tending to prove that the
defending lawyer's activities failed to comply with the standard of
care. 99 A few decisions have held that the peculiar properties of the
fiduciary breach theory allow the plaintiff asserting such a claim to
dispense with the expense and possible forensic drawbacks of supporting
the claim with expert opinion testimony. In fact, according to some of
those decisions, the question of the standard of conduct in a lawyerfiduciary case is a legal and not a factual question. 0 0
On the other hand, the great majority of fiduciary breach decisions
state or strongly intimate that fiduciary breach claims and negligence
claims differ only in their different way of stating a duty, using loyalty
(or whatever different, if limited, standard is recognized) in fiduciary
breach cases and the general duty of care in negligence.1° 1 As a result,
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 16.18 ("Today, allegations of conflicts of interests almost

routinely appear in actions for legal malpractice[,]" indiscriminately citing both fiduciary breach
and negligence cases).
99. E.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52 cmt. g; 5 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19,
§ 33.16.
100. See Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 776 (Cal. App. 1995); David Welch Co. v.
Erskine & Tulley, 250 Cal. Rptr. 339, 341-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (reflecting distinctly minority
position).
101. E.g., 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 14.2 (stating that "a cause of action for
fiduciary breach corresponds to a cause of action for negligence, substituting the fiduciary duty for
the standard of care").
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and specifically with respect to the requirements of proof, the vast
majority of fiduciary breach decisions require the plaintiff-client to offer
expert testimony to the same extent and in much the same way that the
client would
be required to do if the claim were based on a negligence
02
theory.1
b. Causation and Fiduciary Breach
Aside from readily understandable alterations of negligence-based
causation rules in applying the remedies of fee disgorgement'0 3 and
constructive trust,10 4 most fiduciary breach decisions have refused to
relax the so-called proximate cause 1 °5 requirement for damage claims
based on fiduciary breach theories. 10 6 Indeed, the fiduciary breach case
law is sufficiently well-settled to warrant its description-in this and
other respects-as merely substituting for "due care" in the negligence
formulation the concept of "fiduciary duty." All else remains the same,
including the requirements that the plaintiff-client
show breach of the
07
fiduciary duty, causation, and damages. 1
There are, however, some few decisions suggesting notable
differences between claims of fiduciary breach and negligence. Those
decisions suggest that the fiduciary breach theory can be successfully
employed in situations in which the same facts would not support a
102. See 4 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 33.16 (collecting extensive authorities requiring
a plaintiff-client to offer expert testimony in support of a fiduciary breach claim). As is also true of
negligence claims, a plaintiff-client in a fiduciary breach case need not offer expert testimony on the
question of duty and breach when the violation of duty would be easily recognizable by a lay
person. E.g., Homa v. Friendly Mobile Manor, Inc., 612 A.2d 322, 328-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992).
103. See discussion supra Part III.A.
104. See disucssion supra Part IlI. B.
105. Many negligence and fiduciary breach cases tend to use the loose term "proximate cause"
when referring to the two-fold requirement of cause-in-fact and reasonable foreseeability of risk of
harm, and thereby miss the fact that two issues (and not one) are involved. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 34, § 41.
106. See, e.g., Kirkland & Ellis v. CMI Corp., No. 95 C 7457, 1996 WL 559951, at *9-10
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996) (applying Illinois law, holding that "but-for" proximate cause must be
shown to recover consequential damages on a fiduciary breach theory); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding that same kind of showing of
causation and damages is required under both negligence and fiduciary breach theories). See
generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 14.2 (reporting that fiduciary breach actions are
governed by same rules of causation and damages as are negligence claims); Anderson & Steele,
supra note 1, at 253.
107. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19 § 14.2 (listing elements of a client's
action for fiduciary breach as including existence of fiduciary relationship between client and
lawyer, breach of fiduciary duty, and harm to the client, which was proximately caused by the
breach).
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claim for negligence recovery because of the plaintiffs inability to
demonstrate causation, at least with the degree of rigor required of a
negligence claimant. The tantalizing precedent case-into which many
lawyers for plaintiff-clients have subsequently attempted to shoe-horn
their own (often weaker) facts-is the 1994 decision of the Second
Circuit in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon.0 The court
there, in effect, relaxed the normal substantive requirement of causation,
apparently because (and only because) the plaintiffs claim was pleaded
as one for fiduciary breach and not only for negligence.
The facts stated by the court in Boon make it a particularly
sympathetic case in which to allow recovery. Family members (who I
will refer to here as the Leo interests) hired the Milbank law firm to
assist them in buying a controlling interest in a Swiss bank. That
involved a complex arrangement designed to acquire the bank's stock,
which was tied up in bankruptcy. The Leo interests dealt with Milbank
primarily through an agent, Mr. Chan; however, it was clear to Milbank
from an early point and throughout that their clients were the Leo
interests. After much work, and substantial fee payments to Milbank by
the Leo interests, the intended transaction reached an impasse, although
that point was reached only after the Leo interests and the seller signed
an agreement that seemed to confer substantial rights on the Leo
interests. Milbank was aware that the Leo interests intended to work
around the impasse and complete the transaction. In fact, a Milbank
lawyer wrote to the Leo interests assuring them that the firm would do
nothing to prejudice their position under their agreement.
Nonetheless, when Mr. Chan reemerged at Milbank's offices and
informed them that he now proposed to proceed to complete the
transaction in his own name and for his own interest, Milbank resumed
the representation, this time of Mr. Chan, and he ended up in control of
the bank stock. That was done over the protest of the Leo interests and
despite Milbank's earlier assurance to the contrary. The Leo interests
eventually sued Milbank to recover the loss of the profit they would
have turned by purchasing the bank stock themselves. 10 9 Milbank
defended, among other things, on the apparently impressive ground that

108. 13 F.3d 537, 538 (2d Cir. 1994). Boon is cited, without endorsement, by the reporters of
the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4 § 49, reporter's note to cmt. e.
109. The court's opinion indicates that the Leo interests had reached a settlement with Mr.
Chan in order to assure the return to them of an $8.5 million down payment on the transaction that
was supposed to have been escrowed, but which Mr. Chan had managed to get into his own hands.
See Boon, 13 F.3d at 542. The Second Circuit's decision ultimately affirmed the jury's award of $2
million to the Leo interests.
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the Leo interests could not show that any conflicted representation on
the firm's part was the "but for" cause of harm to them, as required
under what the parties agreed was applicable New York law. Milbank
noted in this connection that New York law required a showing of the
strict "but for" version of causation.' 10
The Second Circuit rejected Milbank's reading of New York
causation law, but solely because of the fiduciary breach theory on
which the Leo interests' claim was based."' For that more generous
theory, the court stated in its key ruling, the client need show only that
the firm's fiduciary breach was a "substantial factor" in causing harm;
they were not required to make the more exacting showing of "but for"
causation required in a negligence action." 2
Boon has led a fairly robust life in decisions controlled by New
York law,' 1 3 but has made no headway elsewhere." 4 The Boon decision
involved diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, and thus plainly the court's
decision was an attempt to extract its relaxed causation rule from extant
New York authority," 5 which by itself discourages its export beyond
New York. More importantly, it is not clear that Boon reaches a
defensible result-other than providing the satisfaction that a law firm
shown by the plaintiffs evidence to have engaged in a blatantly
conflicted and wrongful representation was sanctioned. In the first place,
the court's opinion does not mention the remedy of fee-disgorgement,
which would seem to be the preferable remedy, and which does not
require causation between the lawyer's misconduct and the client's

110.

On the New York "but for" test in negligence legal-malpractice actions, see sources cited

supra note 34.
111. Boon, 13 F.3d at 543-44.

112. See id.
113. See, e.g., Fisher v. Reich, No. 92 Civ. 4158, 1995 WL 23966, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
1995) (using the less-demanding "substantial factor" standard in a fiduciary breach action against a
law firm in conflict-ridden representation); Estate of Re v. Kornstein, Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp.
907, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a client could employ the less-exacting "substantial factor"
test to prove causation of harm from a firm's undisclosed amassing of a total of $500,000 in
referrals from the Paul Weiss law firm, which also represented the client's adversary in an
unsuccessful brokerage arbitration).
114. The only reported decision outside of the Second Circuit that has yet considered Boon
refused to follow it on the ground that it did not reflect the applicable law. Garrett v. Bryan Cave
LLP, 211 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000), an unpublished decision whose text is available on Westlaw.
The court's discussion of Boon is at *4-5.
115. Quite unusually, the Second Circuit's opinion in Boon does not mention that it was
applying New York law, or even that the case involved the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction,
although that was plainly the basis of jurisdiction and, hence, New York law should have been
applied.
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recoverable damages. 116 Second, the outcome seems to hold open the
possibility of multiple recoveries for some Boon benefited plaintiffs. On
its own facts, the Leo interests might have ended up with more than
compensatory damages, given that they had already reached a favorable
settlement with Mr. Chan in addition to their judgment against
Milbank. 17 Moreover, even under the court's lesser causation standard,
Boon-type cases seem to generate inherently difficult questions of
causation and damages. Judges in other jurisdictions well might
conclude that adding such problematic complexity to what are already
complex cases for lay jurors is unwarranted. Finally, subsequent
decisions of New York and federal courts are irreconcilable with Boon.
The Second Circuit has itself limited Boon to claims for noncompensatory (restitutionary) relief. 1 8 A recent decision of New York's
intermediate appellate court seems flatly to apply a rule requiring the
same showing of causation in fiduciary breach and negligence cases." 19
And, a developing line of New York state court decisions holds that120a
fiduciary breach claim is simply another way of claiming negligence,
a position that similarly seems irreconcilable with Boon and its federal
progeny.
6. Fiduciary Breach Standards in the Final Analysis
At the end of a perplexing search for the specific and limiting
rationale and standard for imposing fiduciary breach liability on lawyers,
one is tempted to conclude that the fiduciary breach doctrine and its
limited application are best understood as accidents of legal history.
Much of the law involving fiduciary duties was developed in the context
of persons, such as trustees of express trusts, who undertook to act for
another with respect to important property rights. The liability of trustees
and similar fiduciaries developed relatively early and in courts of
equity-lending a fluid and flexible character to the bounds of the
liability. Much of the case law of fiduciary liability developed out of
116.

See discussion supra Part III.A.

117. Neither question, fee forfeiture nor multiple recovery, can be assessed on the basis of
what is reported in the court's opinion. It is possible, of course, that further facts would indicate that
neither was raised by Milbank as an issue in the case or that the issues were raised and rejected for
sound reasons.
118.

See LNC Investments, Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. New Jersey, 173 F.3d 454, 465-66 (2d

Cir. 1999).
119.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d

593, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) ("We have never differentiated between the standard of causation
requested [required?] for a claim of legal malpractice and one for breach of fiduciary duty in the
context of attorney liability. The claims are co-extensive.").
120.

See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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pre-modem settings, where defalcations of a fiduciary were likely to
consist of nothing more than what would now be called theft, usually
accomplished through a devious and self-interested scheme concocted
by the fiduciary. Liability of trustees and others, such as lawyers, for
negligence (including negligence in investing entrusted assets)
developed relatively much later, not until well into the nineteenth
century in England and the United States. Negligence-based liability for
harm caused by a professional has now become well-accepted as the
central concept behind lawyer liability to clients. It has not to this point
been thought to be so inconsistent with negligence-based liability to
continue borrowing from that older (and more limited) area of fiduciary
law.
The resulting melange is today spread upon the pages of
contemporary decisions about the liability of lawyers. If this melange is
indeed mainly explicable as a product of accidents of legal history, it
does not bode well for its capacity to generate an intelligible state of
legal doctrine.
C. Restiveness in JudicialRanks in Dealingwith FiduciaryBreach
Doctrine
While many decisions, typified by those already discussed, have
shown willingness to accept the fiduciary breach claim as an apparently
full equal with the negligence claim, giving it a life of its own, a few
courts, admittedly a small minority at this point, have indicated various
degrees of restiveness about resort to fiduciary breach concepts, at least
on a wholesale and willy-nilly basis as is suggested by the equal-claims
use of fiduciary breach theory.
Among them is the recent decision of the Missouri Supreme Court
in Klemme v. Best.12 1 Plaintiff Klemme was a police officer named in a
federal civil rights action seeking damages against him along with
several other officers and the city that employed them all. All were
represented by lawyer Best. Klemme later claimed, in his fiduciary
breach claim against Best, that Best had met with the lawyer for the civil
rights plaintiffs to discuss a draft complaint prior to its filing. Klemme
alleged that, although Best had information showing that neither
Klemme nor another officer were involved in the incident, Best told the
plaintiff s lawyer only that the other officer, who thereafter was dropped
as a defendant, was uninvolved. Klemme alleged that Best acted to keep

121.

941 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. 1997).
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Klemme in the case in order to advance the interests of the city and its
self-insured association that had actually retained Best. 2 2 Based on
those facts, Klemme sought recovery against Best for "violat[ing] the
fiduciary duties of fidelity, loyalty, devotion, and good faith."'' 2 3 The
trial court dismissed Klemme's case, finding that his pleading failed to
state a claim under state law and that, in any event, it was barred by the
statute of limitations. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, but only on
the limitations point.
The court first defined the elements of a negligence action in the
traditional four-fold way: (1) a client-lawyer relationship; (2) negligent
breach by the lawyer; (3) proximate causation of the client's harm; and
(4) damages. In contrast, according to the court, there were five elements
that had to be established to make out a claim of fiduciary breach: (1) a
client-lawyer relationship; (2) the lawyer's breach of a fiduciary
obligation; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damages, but, as well,
another requirement: (5) demonstration that "no other recognized tort
encompasses the facts alleged."'' 24 Relying in part on an earlier
decision, 125 Klemme elaborated as follows on the fifth element: "[i]f the
alleged breach can be characterized as both a breach of the standard of
care (legal malpractice based on negligence) and a breach of a fiduciary
obligation (constructive fraud), then the sole claim is legal
malpractice."' 126 The court offered no reason for that restrictive definition
of the fiduciary breach claim or for its rule barring overlapping theories
of recovery here.
Reaching much the same result, but through a curiously
proceduralist approach, are several decisions, most of them decisions of
intermediate appellate courts in Illinois. The Illinois decisions have
developed a "same operative facts" test to limit the pleading of a

122. Id. at 495. The court's recitation of the facts is obscure, but perhaps the claim was that
Best kept Klemime (who might have been separately insured) in the case in the interests of enlarging
the pool of defendants who might respond to a settlement orjudgment.
123. Id.
124. Id. at496.
125. Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1995). The Klemme
court's reading of Donahue is difficult to extract from the earlier decision.
126. See Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at 496. The court went on to find that Klemme had sufficiently
alleged a fiduciary breach claim, and that it was not necessary for him to plead or prove that Best
had fraudulent intent. In the process, the court was obviously implying that the same facts would not
warrant a finding of negligence. But see supra note 43 (discussing a decision which held that
conflict-of-interest allegations can be asserted as claims for negligence). In any event, the Klemme
court held that the plaintiffs fiduciary breach claim was time-barred See Klemme, 941 S.W.2d at
497-98.
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fiduciary breach claim along with a negligence claim. 27 An example is
Majumdar v. Lurie,128 where the client pleaded a claim for negligence
based on an assertion that the law firm had proximately caused harm
through its conflicted representation of a competitor while representing
the plaintiff. The client, in a separate count, also pleaded a fiduciary
breach claim, asserting much the same facts in support of that different
29
theory. The court held that the fiduciary breach claim was not viable.
The court first described the two claims as "duplicative"' 130 and then
asserted the following rule:
[A]lthough an action for legal malpractice
is conceptually distinct
from an action for breach of fiduciary duty because not all legal
malpractice rises to the level of a breach of fiduciary [duty] ...when,
as in this case, the same operative facts support actions for legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary [duty] resulting in the same injury
to the client, the actions132are identical and the later [sic] should be
dismissed as duplicative.

Note that the court's result and reasoning are not simply an
application of the election-of-remedies concept, here, requiring a pleader
to elect a remedy when two theories are available on the same facts.
Instead, when the same operative facts support both the theory of
negligence and that of fiduciary breach, the court makes the election not
to permit the plaintiff-client to pursue the fiduciary breach claim. An
articulation of the reason for the court's hostility to the fiduciary breach
claim is, however, entirely absent from any of the Illinois decisions.
Decisions in a few other jurisdictions have followed a similar path.
If sometimes with slightly different phraseology, those other decisions
are similarly reticent in their reasoning. A Colorado decision relied
directly on the Illinois appellate court authority in rejecting a similar
attempt to pursue a fiduciary breach claim that relied on the same facts
127. See, e.g., Kirkland & Ellis v. CMI Corp., No. 95 C 7457, 1996 WL 559951, at *9-10
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1996) (applying Illinois law, dismissing a fiduciary breach counterclaim as
duplicative of a negligence claim); Majumdar v. Lurie, 653 N.E.2d 915, 920-21 (111. App. Ct. 1995);
Calhoun v. Rane, 599 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (Il. Ct. App. 1992). In Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496,
500 (Il1. 2000), the Illinois Supreme Court expressed approval of this line of intermediate appellatecourt decisions.
128. 653 N.E.2d 915.
129. See id.at 920-21. For a decision holding that a complaint pleading facts showing a
lawyer's conflict of interest suffices to show a fiduciary breach, see supra note 43 and

accompanying text.
130. Marjumdar,653 N.E.2d at 920.
131. In context, it is clear that "legal malpractice" is meant to refer to the negligence-based
theory of recovery.
132. See id.
at920-21.
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as a negligence claim.' 33 Somewhat differently, in Dresser Industries,
Inc. v. Digges,134 a federal court (applying Maryland law) refused to
permit a former client (under very sympathetic facts, involving false
billing by a former law firm partner) to recover vicariously against a law
firm on a theory of fiduciary breach. The court so held on the ground
that the claim was merely "duplicitous" of the client's claims for fraud
and malpractice. 135
Finally, a similar movement is afoot in New York, although, as in
Illinois, the decisions are perfunctory, providing no supporting
reasoning. In fact, two potentially confusing lines of relevant decisions
have emerged in recent years, both based on the view that negligence
and fiduciary breach claims in legal-malpractice litigation are redundant,
requiring dismissal of the latter. One of the lines of cases, the one most
obviously relevant here, is based on a refusal by New York courts to
permit a plaintiff to pile on claims such as fiduciary breach when the
36
plaintiff has already asserted a viable claim for negligence. 137
Representative of that line is the 1999 decision in Mecca v. Shang.
The court first held that the plaintiff-client had pleaded a triable
negligence claim that required further proceedings in the trial court.
However, the court ordered dismissal of the plaintiffs additional claims
of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud because "they arise from the same
facts as his legal malpractice claim and do not allege distinct
133. See Moguls of Aspen, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, 956 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Colo. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that a client's requested jury instructions on fiduciary breach were correctly rejected
by the trial court where the facts alleged (involving a lawyer's carelessness and lack of diligence)
constituted negligence and the latter theory was the subject of adequate instruction).
134. CIV. No. JH-89-485, 1989 WL 139234, *1, *7 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 1989); see also, e.g.,
Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Peterson v. Scorsine, 898 P.2d
382, 383 (Wyo. 1995) (stating, in the course of a decision holding that the plaintiff client had failed
to meet the lawyer's expert testimony that challenged practices met local standard of care, that
plaintiffs theories of malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty involved
"altemative theories ... subsumed by the malpractice claim").
135. See Dresser Indus., Inc., 1989 WL 139234 at *7.The court also noted that, while
malpractice involves the breach of a standard of care, a "breach of fiduciary duty does not involve
standard [sic] set by the marketplace; but rather, a standard of moral conduct." Id. On the conductcare dichotomy, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. The description of the fiduciary
breach claim as "moral" is ambiguous, but presumably reflected the court's conclusion that, at least
in the instance before it, the claim of fiduciary breach was a non-legal claim not compensable in a
legal proceeding. On possibly broader, and more menacing, invocations of morality considerations
in fiduciary breach claims, see infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
136. This line of decisions seems to leave many issues unresolved, such as whether the rejected
fiduciary breach claim can be incorporated into the same count as the negligence claim (it would
seem that it cannot), or whether the plaintiff could drop the negligence claim and proceed on only
the fiduciary breach claim (which would be highly risky and thus has not yet been attempted).
137. 685 N.Y.S.2d 458 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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damages." 138 Other similar decisions have explicitly followed Mecca or
reached the same result. 139 Not one provides any rationale, citing only
other decisions in the same line. The second line of decisions involve a
quite different set of issues although, confusingly enough, employing
very similar language. These cases stand for the unremarkable point that,
when a plaintiff pleads multiple claims arising out of the same operative
facts-for example, negligence and fiduciary breach in a legal
malpractice case, and the negligence claim is properly dismissed on a
ground that infects the fiduciary breach claim as well-the fiduciary
breach claim must also be dismissed because both are based on the
"same operative facts."1 40 Unfortunately, sometimes a decision

138. Id. at460.
139. See, e.g., Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780
N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (ordering the reinstatement of a negligence counterclaim,
and "[a]s to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty, we have consistently held that such a claim,
premised on the same facts and seeking the identical relief sought in the legal malpractice cause of
action, is redundant and should be dismissed"); InKline Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62,
63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (dismissing fiduciary breach and contract-breach claims, while remanding
the negligence claim for further proceedings); Estate of Nevelson v. Carro, Spanbock, Kaster &
Cuiffo, 736 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (after reversing the trial court's dismissal of a
negligence claim, and ordering the dismissal of fiduciary breach and contract-breach claims against
a law firm "which are predicated on the same allegations and seek relief identical to that sought in
the malpractice cause of action"); Best v. Law Firm of Queller and Fisher, 718 N.Y.S.2d 397, 397
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000). A very similar line of decisions (already reflected in the InKline and
Nevelson decisions, above) holds that a "redundant" claim of a lawyer's breach of contract based on
the same facts as a claim of negligence is also to be dismissed. See, e.g., Pellegrino v. File, 738
N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (noting that where a negligence claim was too speculative
to survive a pleading motion, the additional "cause of action sounding in breach of contract is
redundant to the malpractice claim" and was ordered dismissed as well); Sage Realty Corp. v.
Proskauer Rose, LLP, 675 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) ("[A] breach of contract claim
premised on the attorney's failure to exercise due care or to abide by general professional standards
is nothing but a redundant pleading of the malpractice claim."); cf Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co.
v. Hurwitz, No. 02 civ. 7612, 2005 WL 774166, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2005) (dismissing a
plaintiff-client's claim for subrogation on the grounds that it was redundant, given the plaintiff's
claim for negligent representation). The concept of defectively redundant claims appears to have
originated in New York medical-malpractice litigation. See, e.g., Winegrad v. Jacobs, 567 N.Y.S.2d
249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (ordering the dismissal of a breach of contract claim in medicalmalpractice litigation as "redundant" of a negligence claim).
140. See, e.g., Sonnenschine v. Giacomo, 744 N.Y.S.2d 396, 398 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002);
Tyborowski v. Cuddeback & Onofry, 718 N.Y.S.2d 489, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). Presumably
these decisions are also based on the court's further finding, which these opinions customarily
assume rather than announce, that the same basis for dismissal, such as the absence of a sufficient
pleading of harm, applies to both theories. Beyond the cases cited here, there are other New York
decisions that are too cryptically described in the reports to allow one to determine to which line of
decisions they properly belong. See, e.g., Daniels v. Lebit, 749 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002) (affirming dismissal of negligence count on statute of limitations grounds, affirming dismissal
of fiduciary breach claim as well on "same facts" ground, but without indicating whether the defect
was the same limitations ground or the broader "same facts" ground).
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presenting an issue relevant only to one of those lines of cases will
dismiss with citation to a case from the other line, 14 1 as if it were
relevant and controlling, which it plainly is not. On the other hand,
some, at least of the first line of decisions, are not subject to this
suspicious error and seem to stand alongside the Illinois line of cases.
The Illinois and New York decisions are problematic, if based
solely on pleading rules. Modem pleading rules permit a plaintiff to
assert as many theories as are available and do not require election of a
single theory or give priority to one theory over another, and certainly
not at the outset of litigation. For that reason, the expected response, as a
matter of procedure to a pleading motion such as those indicated in the
foregoing decisions, is to reject any required narrowing of the plaintiffs
ability to plead both negligence
and fiduciary breach theories, even if
142
facts.
of
set
same
the
on
based
On the other hand, those procedural rules would not stand in the
way of dismissal if the courts were resting decision on the ground that
the dismissed fiduciary breach claim was simply not an available theory
on the same facts. The rationale that the Illinois, New York, and other
courts might be relying on to restrict the fiduciary breach claim, while
assuming that the negligence claim has a significantly broader and more
generously welcomed ambit, is left unstated. 143 There is much, however,
that might be said for a somewhat similar imposition of confining limits
on the fiduciary breach theory. I turn next to a critique supporting such a
limitation on fiduciary breach claims.

141. See, e.g., Coveal v. Consumer Home Mortg., Inc., No. 04-CV-4755(ILG), 2005 WL
704835, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005) (finding that negligence claim was time-barred,
dissmissing fiduciary breach claims, citing Mecca's prohibition against redundant claims);
Sonnenschine, 744 N.Y.S.2d at 398 (finding that negligence claim could not be sustained absent
proper pleading of proximately caused damages, dismissing fiduciary breach under "same operative
facts" test of Mecca); InKline Pharm. Co. v. Coleman, 759 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(dismissing fiduciary breach claim on basis of Sonnenschine in Mecca type case).
142. The argument has rarely been asserted in most jurisdictions, doubtless because of the
clarity of the procedural rules permitting alternative pleading of theories. When the issue has been
raised, it has been promptly rejected. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832
F. Supp. 1528, 1531-32 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that, due to liberality of pleading rules, a
defending law firm must defend against both negligence and fiduciary breach claims, even if
founded on the same set of facts).
143. There are indications in Illinois cases that the "same operative facts" test reflects a general
view that fiduciary breach claims are simply a variant subsumed within negligence. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Coronent Ins. Co., 689 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (I11.Ct. App. 1997) (stating that because a
claim of fiduciary breach is "[i]ncluded within the rubric of legal malpractice," the rule barring
assignment of negligence claims also bars assignment of fiduciary breach claims) (alteration in
original) (quoting Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 649 (I11.Ct. App. 1997).
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CRITIQUE OF THE "EQUAL-CLAIMS" VERSION OF FIDUCIARY
BREACH THEORY IN LEGAL-MALPRACTICE CASES

Against the background of the treatment of negligence and
fiduciary breach claims, the point has been reached where the
appropriate reach of each claim can be assessed. Among the questions to
be answered are those discussed below. Given the general availability of
the negligence theory as a vehicle for recovery of damages in most (but
not all) instances of lawyer wrongdoing, and given the special
availability of the fiduciary breach theory to provide equitable recovery
in several instances of perceived special need, should there be any
further function available to be filled by the fiduciary breach theory?
Specifically, should the theory be available, as it is in many, but not all,
states, as an amiable companion theory to negligence in the mine run of
actions to recover compensation for injuries caused by a lawyer's
careless lawyering? As the terminology is employed here, should the
equal-claims concept of fiduciary breach continue to offer malpractice
plaintiffs the option of proceeding under the umbrellas of both
negligence and, simultaneously, fiduciary breach? I offer here what I
consider to be compelling reasons why courts should refuse to extend
the fiduciary breach theory any further than its special-function role as a
remedial concept (as in fee-forfeiture and constructive-trust cases), as a
possible basis for handling emerging and novel claims of lawyer
misconduct that seem worthy of treatment as tortious but that fit
uncomfortably within the confines of negligence, and in all instances, as
a powerful heuristic assertion about the nature of the client-lawyer
relationship in all its manifestations.
A.

The Infelicity of the Equal-Claims Version of FiduciaryBreach

To start, what should be the reach, if any, of the equal-claims
version of substantive fiduciary breach law? Among other
considerations, the opinions embracing the equal-claims version of
fiduciary breach doctrine are inarticulate about an obvious, first-order
question: why should the concept of a claim based on breach of fiduciary
duty not extend to all of the defaults of a lawyer? To be sure, that would
make the fiduciary breach concept coterminous with negligence, but
what is objectionable about that? Once a court has accepted the prospect
of a significant area of overlap between the two, on what principled
basis can a court say that enough overlap-short of total congruence-is
enough?
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Surely the concept of lawyer-as-fiduciary is an expansive one. It
underpins the entire client-lawyer relationship. In fact, opinions can be
found describing the scope of fiduciary duty so expansively as to
encompass a lawyer's duty to operate competently. 44 It unquestionably
underpins many of the provisions of modem lawyer codes dealing with a
lawyer's duties to a client, 145 and most courts permit proof of a lawyer's
violation of a lawyer code provision to be introduced as evidence of a
lawyer's failure to conform to the applicable standard of care. 146 Given
that the fiduciary underpinnings reach so extensively into clients'
damages litigation, it might seem odd to some that courts have seen fit
(as many have) to arrest the fiduciary breach theory of liability short of
what is arguably its ultimate logic.
Would it then be wise to expand the theory of fiduciary breach as a
liability rule so that it was coterminous with negligence, so that, in other
words, any claim of negligence could be coupled with a companion
claim of fiduciary breach? That, in its most dramatic form, is the
question posed by the existence of the fiduciary breach theory as a
liability rule. It is the question to which I now turn.
B. Occam's Razor: Equal-ClaimsFiduciaryBreach as a Needless
Proliferationof Theories of Recovery
A central objection to the general availability of the "equal-claims"
version of the fiduciary breach concept is that it produces a needless
proliferation of theories of recovery. Aside from one-sided and unfair
1 47
forensic advantage to a skillful plaintiffs advocate, next considered,
why have the many courts that have done so tolerated the undisciplined
spread of the fiduciary breach theory into much of the realm already
occupied and, for all that is said, adequately served by the negligence
theory? For example, what consideration of public policy suggests that it
is preferable to provide a plaintiff with multiple theories of recovery on
the same facts? (I, obviously, can think of none.) On the other hand,
144. See, e.g., Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating, in
assessing a fiduciary breach claim against a lawyer, "[t]he duty to deal fairly, honestly, and with
undivided loyalty superimposes onto the attorney-client relationship a set of special and unique
duties, including maintaining confidentiality, avoiding conflicts of interest, operating competently,
safeguarding client property and honoring the clients' interest over the attorney's.") (quoting In re
Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994)).
145. See generally WOLFRAM, supra note 24, § 4.1 (discussing the centrality of fiduciary
concepts to the law of the client-lawyer relationship).
146. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 52 reporter's note to cmt. f; see also supra notes 3640, 46 and accompanying text.
147. See infra Part V.C.
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there are non-trivial reasons for a judge to wish to rein in such a
proliferation of theories; among them is the increased risk of jury
confusion and the sheer addition of more procedural and substantive
rulings that the judge must make as the number of permitted claims
increases.
One possible response to a needless proliferation argument is that
theory-proliferation is not unique to legal-malpractice litigation. To be
sure, it is not uncommon in negligence cases to see a number of
additional theories of recovery advanced, such as claims for breach of
contract. 48 Beyond legal-malpractice litigation, many other areas of
litigation commonly see multiple theories of recovery advanced and
accepted by courts.

49

Theory proliferation

can thus arguably be

regarded as a litigational norm. In response, I would reply in a two-fold
way. First, it is not clear that the other areas of proliferated claims
involve the same degree of unfair prejudice to the defending party (to be
discussed next) as does the use of the equal-claims version of fiduciary
breach doctrine. Second, to the extent that theory-proliferation does
cause similar problems, proliferation should be resisted in each such area
as well.
C. Rhetorical Overkill: The Potentialfor Distortionin Employing
FiduciaryBreach Rhetoric in Legal-Malpractice Cases
For a plaintiff-client's lawyer assessing potentially available routes
to recovery, the appeal of the fiduciary breach theory is, obviously, that
it can readily be used to set an apparently more exacting standard of
lawyer conduct, perhaps far more exacting, than what a jury might
gather from a judge's instruction based on the more pedestrian and
straightforward negligence standard. There must be great emotional
impact when an apparently disinterested judge reading a jury instruction
employs such charged language as that quoted above. 150 Added to a
highly favorable jury instruction is the consideration that the plaintiffs
advocate can adopt the rhetoric of high duty without sounding
suspiciously overblown. Perhaps of equal advantage, the plaintiffs
expert witnesses can repeat from the witness stand the lofty demands
and apparently inflexible and all-sweeping reach of fiduciary orthodoxy,
employing language far more colorful and apparently demanding of the
lawyer-defendant than the negligence standard alone would warrant. The
148.
149.

See supranote 139 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 227-28 (5th ed. 2001).

150.

See supra Part lV.B.1.
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combined impact on a common-law jury must be so decidedly one-sided
that it is remarkable that the matter has not received more careful
judicial scrutiny.
D. The "Stacking" Problem:Equal-Claims Pleadingof Fiduciary
Breach Theory as Inequitable Scale-Tipping
A further, and rather dramatic, problem is that recognizing a broad
overlap between fiduciary breach claims and run-of-the-mill negligence
claims plainly stacks the deck unfairly in favor of plaintiffs. That is a
problem that has nothing to do with forensic advantage, just discussed.
The present problem can be illustrated in simple mathematical terms.
Suppose that a plaintiff has a negligence case that-on the relevant facts
and law-stands a 60% chance of success. Suppose further that the
jurisdiction permits the plaintiff to also assert, on the same facts, a
fiduciary breach claim, and assume that the chance of success on that
theory is also 60%.151 Suppose that the plaintiff seeks $100,000 in
damages, again based on the same factual theory of damage recovery.
The ability to assert the second, parallel theory of fiduciary breach
creates inherent unfairness; it is as if the plaintiff were permitted to roll
the dice twice. If only the legal-malpractice claim (or only the fiduciary
breach claim) could be pursued at trial, the plaintiff would value her
claim at $60,000. But, because the plaintiff also has a 60% chance of
prevailing on the separate fiduciary breach theory, 152 the value of the
plaintiffs claim increases to an overall 84% chance of recovering
$100,000,153 which, of course, increases the settlement value of the
plaintiffs case to $84,000.154 Obviously, as different percentage values
are attached to the two theories, the overall value will rise or fall. But the
151. The percentages given here for the probability of recovery on each theory are arbitrary. In
real-life situations, however, lawyers typically compute such probabilities within relatively narrow
ranges, at least once discovery is closed and all substantive issues have been resolved through in
limine motions. The illustration uses the same figure (60%) as the likelihood of recovery for both
claims. However, it would often be more realistic to place a higher probability of recovery on the
fiduciary breach theory to reflect such advantages as more favorable jury instructions and other
forensic advantages of that theory. See supra Part V.C.
152. The theories are "separate" in the sense that I assume the trial court would uphold a
verdict for the plaintiff-client on either theory, even if the jury were to return a defense verdict on
the other.
153. The increase to 84% occurs because of the compounding effect produced by the (assumed
to be independently operating) probabilities of 60% chance of recovery on each of the two theories,
much as would occur with multiple discount rates off a gross price. See generally MORRIS H.
DEGROOT, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 43-44 (2d ed. 1989).

154. Similar "stacking" problems occur when a prevailing party at trial is granted a new trial
after appellate reversal of the original outcome.
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stacking effect will remain, rising by a product of multiplication that will
reflect an increase in the component values of each claim, solely because
of the ability to pursue both theories. To be sure, in real life there might
be downside risks to the plaintiff from asserting both theories, such as
the risk of jury confusion or impatience. But it seems improbable that
such drawbacks would ordinarily offset the effects of theory-stacking.
In sum, there are substantial and substantive reasons for a court to
refuse to permit a plaintiff in a legal-malpractice case based on
negligence to proceed as well with an alternative claim of fiduciary
breach. The decisions refusing to permit the pursuit of a companion
fiduciary breach claim in a negligence case' 55 correctly refuse to ratchet
up a malpractice plaintiffs chance of recovery, although their language
of duplicitous pleading might mask those reasons as if they amounted to
nothing more than pleading niceties. Much more is at stake.
A final question, the answer to which is by this point obvious, is
whether the plaintiff-client should be afforded an election of which
theory-negligence or fiduciary breach-to proceed with in attempting
to recover from the lawyer. The ways in which the general negligence
theory and the exceptional fiduciary breach theory have developed in the
American law of lawyering strongly indicates that the former should be
the normal theory, with the latter reserved for special instances in which
both substantive law and remedial law recognize a56 special basis for
liability, a much more limited role considered below.1
VI.

FIDUCIARY BREACH IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS

The analysis to this point would strip away many, but not all,
applications of the fiduciary breach theory in what are otherwise
negligent-lawyer lawsuits. What would be left is a fully broad and robust
doctrine of professional negligence, coupled as it already is with
extending rules of punitive damages or intentional-tort recovery for rare
instances of particularly outrageous lawyer breaches. Yet, here as
always, bath water and babies must be disposed of selectively: there also
remain legitimate and useful roles for fiduciary breach concepts. They
will next be examined and include both substantive and remedial
aspects.

155. See supra notes 121-41 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Parts VI.
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The Substantive Reach of FiduciaryBreach Law as Applied to
Lawyers

There are two ways in which substantive fiduciary breach theory
has been, and should continue to be, available to plaintiff-clients in

actions against their lawyers, areas in which the fiduciary breach theory
has become well-accepted by traditional and now routine application and

non-routine instances in which emerging theories of recovery lend
themselves particularly well to fiduciary concepts.

1. Traditional Substantive Areas
Several areas of plaintiff-client recovery are now well-established
in which the primary substantive theory of recovery has traditionally

been recognized to be that of fiduciary breach. As with many other areas
of traditional equity (such as the injunction and the law of trusts), those
areas have now become so well recognized that they are routinely
available to plaintiff-clients whose claims fit within their accepted
contours. Already considered are actions by a client to recover against a
lawyer for disgorgement of profits gained by the lawyer either in an
impermissible business transaction with the client' 57 or in the misuse of

the

client's confidential

information

to make

an advantageous

158

acquisition from a third person.
Also included without question are
traditional applications of fiduciary breach law to wrongful lawyer
infliction of harm on a client that is intentional.' 59
Those areas seem entirely appropriate for coverage by fiduciary
breach theory. The factual settings out of which they arise fit into
traditional negligence doctrine either uncomfortably or not at all. None

of the excepted settings involve a lawyer's non-intentional, negligent
act-except in the somewhat attenuated and circular sense that the

See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 126.
158. See id. at § 60, cmt. C; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (1958).
159. That is obviously implicit in the many decisions holding that fraud or other intentional act
is not necessary to be shown in order for a client to establish that a lawyer breached a fiduciary duty
owed to the client. See, e.g., Stockton v. Ford, 50 U.S. (11 How.) 232, 247 (1850) (stating, in the
course of affirming an order imposing a constructive trust on a client's property purchased by the
client's lawyer at execution sale, that "[n]either fraud nor imposition need be shown"); Baker v.
Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 502 (1879) (stating "[a]ctual fraud in such cases is not necessary to give
the client a right to redress," in imposing a constructive trust on client's property purchased by a
lawyer). See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, § 14.4 (collecting authorities for the
proposition that a client need not show wrongful intent or motive of the lawyer to establish breach
of fiduciary duty by the lawyer). As indicated above, the one specific instance of fiduciary breach
that an early draft of the Restatement would have retained was intentional lawyer conduct. See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
157.
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lawyer has negligently ignored a legal duty. They are areas that have
always been understood to fit within the concept of fiduciary duty, 6 °
whatever else that concept might encompass. 6 1 And, because of their
routine, well-settled character, they impose no significant additional
burden on courts62 in fleshing out their limits and applying them to
individual cases. 1
2. Emerging Applications of Substantive Fiduciary Breach Law
Quite different are newly emerging instances in which plaintiffclients have attempted to extend the law of legal malpractice to
encompass violations of lawyer duties that have not traditionally been
recognized as a basis for recovery. Those instances should be tested by
the traditional, and stringently applied, willingness of courts of equity to
relax the normally applicable common law rules limiting relief only on
an exceptional basis and for particularly compelling reasons. I offer two
candidates that, to my mind, are legitimate candidates for applying
fiduciary breach theory so as to routinize what has thus far been either
treated as extraordinary or, in the other instance, occasionally denied as
a basis for liability: (1) a former-client conflict claim; and (2) a claim by
a client against a lawyer who entered into a sexual relationship with the
client in the course of the representation.
a.

Former-Client-Conflict Claims

One of the most frequently-encountered bases for legal-malpractice
liability is the lawyer's involvement in a conflicted representation that
causes injury to the plaintiff-client. 163 One familiar type of conflict has,
however, not produced very many decisions or a settled body of law
permitting recovery thus far. That unsettled area involves what those of
us in the legal-ethics trade call "former-client conflicts," an
impermissible later representation by a client's former lawyer in which
the lawyer represents a person with interests adverse to those of the
original client in the same matter or one that is substantially related to

160. See supraPart IV.A-B.
161. Recall that many decisions, for example, have regarded business-transaction violation
settings as appropriate negligence cases.
162. For similar reasons, radical doctrinal surgery to prune much of the reach from alreadyrecognized applications of fiduciary breach law seems entirely unnecessary. Thus, the proposal of
Professor Meredith Duncan to limit fiduciary breach claims, among other things, to those in which
the plaintiff can show causally inflicted actual harm through criminal or fraudulent lawyer action
seems unwarranted. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1167.
163. See generally 2 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 19, §§ 16.1-16.20.
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the earlier representation. 164 The theoretical difficulty in readily
concluding that such facts support a negligence claim is the absence of a
client-lawyer relationship at the time of the lawyer's wrongful
conduct. 165 Of course, not all decisions suggest that such a problem bars
a negligence action for a former-client conflict. 66 My present point is
the modest one that, if the state of law in a jurisdiction precludes a court
from finding that the requisite client-lawyer relationship existed at the
time of the wrongful conduct, thus barring resort to a claim of
negligence, the court should feel entirely free to provide a cause of
67
action to the client through the fiduciary breach theory. 1
b.

Sexual-Relations Claims

The second area in which I would suggest the use of fiduciary
breach concepts to enable a plaintiff-client to recover involves a client
with whom the lawyer had entered into a sexual relationship during the
representation. A case usefully setting a testing factual situation is the
recent New York trial-court decision in Guiles v. Simser. 168 Joining the

164. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 132; WOLFRAM, supra note 24 § 7.4. See
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2004).
165. On the general prerequisite of a client-lawyer relationship to support a negligence claim,
see RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, §§ 50-51 (stating the duties of care owed to clients and
enumerating the limited duties of a lawyer to a restricted list of non-clients, respectively). The
Restatement, however, assumes, perhaps rather blithely, that a negligence remedy is available to a
former client for the former lawyer's violation of the prohibition against former-client conflicts. Id.
at §50 cmt. c. (citations omitted) (stating that "a lawyer still owes certain duties to a former client,
for example, to ... avoid certain conflicts of interest. Breach of such duties, . .. may be remedied
through a malpractice action in circumstances coming within this Section."); id. at § 132 cmt. a
(stating that if a lawyer breaches her duties to a former client, such as those implied by the formerclient conflict rule, "the remedy of professional malpractice might be available... "). Several
decisions have done the same. See, e.g., Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 303 (Alaska 1997)
(finding a duty of lawyers to former clients and stating that a claim for malpractice for breach of
that duty can be maintained).
166. For example, in Damron v. Herzog, 67 F.3d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1995), the court,
applying Idaho law, held that a former client could maintain a malpractice action on the theory that,
with respect to the lawyer's obligation not to take any action that would materially impair the work
done for the former client, the lawyer would be deemed to have a "reattach[ed]" client-lawyer
relationship with the former client. While the outcome might be commendable, the court's approach
seems less than elegant.
167. In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994), see supra Part
IV.B.5.b, the court apparently assumed that the fiduciary breach theory would allow recovery by a
former client. At a point, the court, in explaining why a lesser standard of causation should apply,
described the case as follows: "There is an even more compelling reason to apply a prophylactic
rule to remove the incentive to breach when the fiduciary relationship is that of an attorney and
former client because of the attorney's unique position of trust and confidence." Id. at 543.
168. 804 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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still-rare instances 169 in which a client has attempted to recover damages
from the lawyer in such a setting, the Simser court granted summary
judgment to the lawyer, although on grounds that, if followed in
subsequent New York decisions, would permit other such plaintiffs to
reach a jury. At one level, the Simser facts suggest a strong case: the
sexual relationship was amply proved, there was proof that it had been
initiated by the defendant lawyer, and it occurred during a divorce
representation-an area in which New York's unique and specific
lawyer code prohibition against entering into sexual relations with a
client1 70 directly applies. In the view of the court, however, the plaintiffclient's downfall was her deposition testimony in which she portrayed
the relationship as one into which she entered enthusiastically and
without any independently inappropriate conduct on the part of the
lawyer (such as coercion). Her testimony provided such details as the
ways that she and her lawyer had attempted to hide their law-office sex
play from the lawyer's then-employer. 171 While fully agreeing that
169. Much as with the modem treatment of the now-discredited actions for seduction or breach
of promise to marry, damages actions by clients against a lawyer for inappropriate sexual relations
have thus far received a cautious welcome from courts. See, e.g., Tante v. Herring, 453 S.E.2d 686
(Ga. 1994) (holding that a client could proceed on a fiduciary breach, but not malpractice, theory);
Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640 (Il. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a pleading sufficiently alleged that a
lawyer breached fiduciary duty in gaining sexual favors from his client and then failed to pursue
claim for reimbursement of attorney fees for fear that the client's husband would raise the issue of
the sexual relationship); Doe v. Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Il. 1991) (holding that a lawyer's
engaging in sexual conduct with the plaintiff and other clients did not support a RICO claim);
Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 105-06 (Il. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a plaintiff
could not recover on a fiduciary breach theory in the absence of a claim that the plaintiff suffered a
loss or compromise of legal position in the underlying legal action); cf McDaniel v. Gile, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a lawyer's conduct in withholding legal services to
coerce a client into a sexual relationship and the sexual harassment of the client constituted grounds
for a claim of intentional infliction of mental distress, and a lawyer's abandonment of a client on her
refusal of sex stated grounds for a claim of negligence); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a client could proceed to trial to attempt to support a claim that
she suffered personal injuries due to an ectopic pregnancy after she engaged in sexual relations with
her lawyer after he gave verbal assurance that he could not get anyone pregnant). See Margit
Livingston, When Libido Subverts Credo. Regulation of Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 5, 25-34 (1993) (reviewing comprehensively the availability to clients of civil
remedies against a lawyer).
170. N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-Il l(B)(3) ("A lawyer shall not: ... 3. [i]n
domestic relations matters, enter into sexual relations with a client during the course of the lawyer's
representation of the client.").
171. See Simser, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 907. ("She testified that she and Simser, on visits to his law
office, would connive to prevent their fondlings from becoming known to Mr. Garufi, his employer
and supervising lawyer. 'It was almost a game. It was like we were little kids trying not to get
caught doing something. We knew we were doing something we weren't supposed to be doing."').
Because of the client's complicity in hiding the relationship, successfully, from the employing
lawyer, the same court in an unreported decision had earlier dismissed the plaintiffs claims against
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Simser's conduct flatly violated the New York lawyer code prohibition,
the court refused to base liability on the fact of that violation alone.
Noting the absence of any aggravating fact, such as coercion, the
bartering of sex for legal services, or misuse of the client's confidential
information, the 172
court refused to find that the plaintiff had sustained
actionable harm.

The rather clear implication of the opinion is that the presence of
one or more of the listed aggravating facts would suffice to support a
claim for fiduciary breach. 173 With that I fully agree. Any one or more of
those facts would sufficiently indicate the kind of injury that is readily
susceptible of judicial remedy, and without any significant risk that the
claim constitutes a bald attempt at litigational extortion.
the employer based on theories of secondary liability. Guiles v. Simser, unreported, No. 2003-0775
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Apr. 25, 2005).
172. 1d. at *3-4 (citations omitted); see Simser, 804 N.Y.S.2d at 908:
Unlike the typical case contemplated by the Manual, there is no evidence here that
defendant misused information disclosed by the client in any manner resulting in a
detriment to her legal position or that he bartered his services for sex. Nor is there any
proof of damages to the client by reason of erroneous, inadequate or laggardly legal
advice or dilatory tactics by the lawyer in dealing with the matter entrusted to him .... In
short, plaintiff has shown no injury to her position in relation to her case.
Where no such detriment can be shown, and where the only apparent injury to the client
is emotional, we are left with a complaint which occupies the same ground as the former
action for seduction. That cause of action has been repealed as exploitive and often
extortionate ....
Under these circumstances, and even assuming a breach of duty by Simser in the form of
a violation of DR 5-111 (B)(3), it is not clear what remedy, at law or in equity, could be
rendered to plaintiff by the court in the event of trial except such emotional distress
damages (or heart balm, in the parlance of that bygone era) as would have been
available, before repeal, in the much reviled cause of action for seduction. Meantime,
Simser lost his position at Mr. Garufi's law office and was subjected to such disciplinary
measures as the Committee on Professional Standards deemed necessary and
appropriate.
The court shares the plaintiff's reprehension that a member of the bar has broken the
rules and caused her personal embarrassment and chagrin. But the offender has been
punished and plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an injury, in the nature of verifiable and
compensable emotional distress, or any legal detriment caused by Simser's behavior.
Thus, she has not stated a cognizable claim.
The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted.
Id. For an extended discussion, see Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).
173. On facts similar to those in Simser, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reached a similar
result. See Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 830. The plaintiff, however, had not pleaded a fiduciary breach
theory and thus the court explicitly refused to pass on possible liability of the lawyer under that
theory. Id. at 837-38.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol34/iss3/4

48

Wolfram: A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice
20061

FIDUCIARY BREACH AS LEGAL MALPRACTICE

It is also arguable that the factual setting presented to the Second
Circuit in the Boon case was an apt occasion for developing a new
substantive rule of proximate cause, although for reasons that would not
extend to all situations that have traditionally fallen under the fiduciary
breach umbrella. 174 Perhaps Boon should be understood as an isolated
instance in which the court permitted relaxation of the burden of proving
causation because the wrongful act of the defendant-lawyers made it
particularly difficult for the plaintiff-client to prove causation. The
firm's assistance to the successor client in making the acquisition being
attempted by the plaintiff-clients made it difficult, perhaps impossible,
for the latter to demonstrate that, but for the lawyers' wrongful act, they
would have completed the transaction themselves. While there are
problems with such a theory (redolent of the difficulties posed by any
"loss of a chance" theory of recovery), at the least, fiduciary theory
could be of assistance in properly aligning the relevant considerations.
B. The Remedial Reach of FiduciaryBreach Law
Much like certain claims of fiduciary breach that have worked their
way into well-settled categories of legal-malpractice recovery, several
equitable remedies have emerged from the history of fiduciary law and
are now being commonly applied to lawyers in a fashion that is close to
routine. Already discussed have been the equitable remedies of feedisgorgement 175 and imposition of a constructive trust. 176 Another is the
remedy of injunction, which has occasionally been applied by courts to
prevent a lawyer's threatened or continued fiduciary breach. 177 In all
such instances, the court is not hampered by the problems of
indeterminate theory that hampers articulation of fiduciary breach theory
in equal-claims settings. In each area, the relevant substantive and
174. See Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1994)
(discussing the general requirement that the plaintiff in a fiduciary breach claim demonstrate cause);
Part IV.B.5.b.
175. See supra Part III.A.
176. See supra Part III.B.
177. Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1992) (affirming
the trial court's grant of injunctive relief against a law firm proceeding against a former client). See
also Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1964), mandate clarified, 370 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1966); Oxford Dev. Minn., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 428 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(issuing a preliminary injunction against a county attorney who participated in tax litigation or
otherwise assisted county agents); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Duncan, Weinberg, Miller &
Pembroke, P.C., 986 P.2d 35 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (ordering an injunction against former members of
a corporate client's general-counsel staff); cf. In re Polur, 579 N.Y.S.2d 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(disciplining a lawyer for violation of disqualification order and injunction enforcing
disqualification).
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remedial law is relatively well-settled. In none of those areas is it likely
that the court will be confronted with a needless proliferation of theories
of liability. And, to the extent that any such instance should arise
similarly to that considered here-of entire overlap between a
negligence claim and a fiduciary breach claim arising out of the same set
of facts-the court should engage in a similar pruning of liability
theories of the kind urged here.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is much appeal in the original suggestion of Professors
Anderson and Steele 178 for creating, through judicial decision or
legislation, a unitary cause of action against a lawyer for misconduct
causing a client harm. While not separately analyzed here, in many
jurisdictions there seems to be a comparable proliferation of additional
and parallel theories in legal-malpractice litigation through recognition
of such theories as breach of contract. In fact, in a strange reversal,
Illinois-the jurisdiction that has been perhaps most prominent in not
permitting a client to plead alternatively both fiduciary breach and
negligence on the same facts' 7 9-has nonetheless permitted the plaintiffclient to plead and proceed to trial with alternative theories of both
negligence and breach of contract for the same wrongful conduct by the
lawyer. 180 It would seem that alternative maintenance of contract and tort
theories is subject to many of the same criticisms as those that should
prevent alternative maintenance of fiduciary breach and negligence.
Notably, New York courts have treated both fiduciary breach claims and
those based on contract as susceptible to the same restrictive rule when
they are pleaded simply as another way of describing negligence. 181
Much of the needless and messy proliferation of fiduciary breach
theory is court-created; it seems susceptible to repair through the same
common-law process. Courts should resist the appeals of lawyers for
plaintiff-client to proliferate theories of recovery that merely overlap
each other. Principally, that should result in elimination of the equalclaims version of the fiduciary breach theory. That does not entail that
courts also cut back on legitimate uses of such theories for intentional
lawyer wrongdoing, for traditional equitable remedies, and as an

178.
179.
180.
181.
593, 596

See Anderson & Steele, supra note 1.
Seesupra notes 127-36
Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 1992).
See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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occasional basis for recognizing otherwise compelling client claims that
fall outside hitherto, traditional standards for negligence-based recovery.
As discussed here, all those are legitimate, if more limited, roles to play
in righting the harms caused by lawyer wrongs.
QUESTION AND ANSWERS

PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you very much, very provocative.
And we invite questions. Now it's the audience's turn to do its job.
MR. NELSON: Cliff Nelson. The question is, it's my
understanding that punitive damages are available in a breach of
fiduciary duty where the cause of action is framed as breach of fiduciary
duty, whereas in a more typical legal malpractice action you would be
limited to compensatory damages.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: It turns out not really to be so. You can
find authority for that, but I think those are today almost words. Most
fiduciary duty cases say that fiduciary duty simply addresses the
question of the standard; and every other component of legal malpractice
including proximate causation, damages, et cetera, and limitation on
damages applies, so that if you want punitives you have to prove
intentional, malicious conduct, whatever the local standard is. So it turns
out that's not a differentiation. I go through a long exercise in which I
try to tease out things like punitive damages, different statutes of
limitations, et cetera, as indicators of differences between them. That, it
turns out, is not much of an indicator.
PROFESSOR ZIEGLER: Carol Ziegler. I look forward to reading
the paper. I guess I have always thought about breach of fiduciary duty
claims as having the aroma of a betrayal that was going on.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: And being careless of a client's cause
of all action is not betrayal?
PROFESSOR ZIEGLER: Different kind of betrayal. This is my
question. If we were to abolish this separate claim, what would happen
to a causation and would what you now consider something suitable for
breach of fiduciary duty claim, confidentiality breaches, conflict of
interest problems, where but-for causation was relaxed? Would that
persist or would we have but-for causation for the entire claim of legal
malpractice?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: I couldn't begin to tell you based on
every decision. But every category of decisions that is treated, for
example, conflicts of interest or misuse of client confidential
information, you can also find pleaded, proved and judgments affirmed
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on a theory of legal malpractice. In other words, it's not necessary to
have fiduciary breach in order to reach that result. You get it with legal
malpractice. I don't want to pretend to say that there is an exact
equivalent or that there is no difference. Plainly, for example, the
Milbank Tweed v. Boon 182 case thought, on grounds sufficient to the
court, at least, that there was an important difference and that their
proximate causation standard should be more generous because it was a
fiduciary breach case. I have a different explanation, although it
somewhat imperfectly covers the facts. And that is, where a lawyer's act
has removed the possibility of the plaintiff demonstrating the presence of
proximate causation, that's an appropriate occasion, at least to cast the
burden on the lawyer, of demonstrating lack of causation. The court
didn't quite go that far because it required the plaintiff to show some
causation.
PROFESSOR ZIEGLER: But should there be a remedy for misuse
of the client confidential information absent provable but-for damages?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Absent what?
PROFESSOR ZIEGLER: What I'm asking is should there be a
breach-should there be a remedy for conflicts or for breach of use of
confidences, even if you cannot establish causation? Even if you can't
establish specific damages related to the breach?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Okay. Damages-if by damages you
are including the plaintiffs legal fees that the plaintiff client was paying
to the lawyer at the time the disclosure-presumably unknown to the
client-was being made, there is a remedy for that. And that's the
disgorgement remedy. The disloyal agent cannot keep the compensation.
And lawyers, at least going forward, can't keep the fruits of work done
while, for example, violating the rights of their client.
PROFESSOR ZIEGLER: One more word then I'll yield. What
about punitive damages in that kind of circumstance?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: I think you and I can readily imagine
many cases in which punitive damages would fit a jurisdiction's
description. It would be outrageous; very likely it would be almost
malicious misuse. I can also imagine hypotheticals, and maybe so can
you, in which it would be maybe accidental that one has done this,
where they wouldn't be available.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Chuck, you're right, I have never
adequately dealt with this issue and I have found this very interesting
and important and provocative. My concern is that of the first speaker. A
182.

Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994).
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lawyer malpractice case is a negligence case. And with regard to
punitive damages, I don't think you are going to get-you are less likely,
certainly, to get punitive damages even for willful wrong or for reckless
disregard. I think there is more authority historically that a willful or
reckless breach of a fiduciary obligation will result in punitive damages.
And I think I would rather be, from what I remember of the cases I have
seen, I would feel myself representing a plaintiff, a former client, in a
much stronger position arguing for punitive damages where the breach
of the fiduciary obligation, say the conflict of interest, as in Milbank
Tweed you mentioned, is a particularly egregious one, a willful one, a
reckless one, however you want to characterize it, than trying to get
punitive damages in what a court is more likely to look at as professional
negligence, and you don't get punitive damages for negligence.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Well, I think you're right. At least on
the second point you are plainly right. As a plaintiff you would rather
have every possible shaft to throw. But that doesn't necessarily mean
that the system ought to accord that kind of election to the plaintiff. You
are positively right that it would be easier to make out whatever the
standard is for punitive damages if you start from the base of the typical
rhetoric that is given to the jury in the judge's instruction. And certainly
the experts can argue it based on fiduciary breach decisions. Which
seems to create this very, very high road that lawyers must comport
with, unlike legal malpractice where it looks like a much more middling
road. I guess on your first point, I just read the cases somewhat
differently. At least what the cases are saying, what they seem to be
doing, is to apply the same standard that-the punitive damages standard
that's applied in all of tort law or negligence cases to the particular field
of professional negligence. Final point in all of this, obviously, is that
most plaintiffs stay away from punitive damages because they don't
want to run into a problem in collecting a judgment out of an insurance
company. They might want to get leverage, but punitives are found very
rarely in legal malpractice cases, the pleading of them.
MR. SHIRLEY: Evan Shirley. In lawyer malpractice cases, many
jurisdictions allow evidence of violation of the lawyer disciplinary rules
to be introduced. Is that true in breach of fiduciary duty as well?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: I don't know any differentiation.
That's pretty standard across the country though, with a wrinkle in a
jurisdiction or two. In Washington, for example, you can talk about the
lawyer rules but you can't say "lawyer rules." You have to frame it
somewhat differently.
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MR. SHIRLEY: Doesn't matter between legal malpractice and
fiduciary duty?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: No, the courts seem to be as willing in
each area to let experts rely on them, to get instructions out of the lawyer
code rules, etc., no differentiation.
PROFESSOR LUBET: That was my question.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Some people just like to get up as
often as they can to show off their long-standing loyalty to the White
Sox. That hat that Steve has on, I want you to know, is an old White Sox
hat. He's been a fan sincePROFESSOR LUBET: 1952. The hat is from 1967.
PROFESSOR POWELL: My question or comment can't be put as
succinctly. I'm Burnele Powell, University of South Carolina. They say
that you remember the games that you lost, you know, over time. I was
out in Missouri and asked to advise on an ethics matter involving a
nationwide corporation that had an attorney working for them. The
attorney had worked for them for ten or fifteen years, had written up all
their franchise contracts. And then one day he retired and the next day
wrote all the franchisees in the country and said, I have been
representing the company for the last fifteen years, wrote all of their
contracts for them, and I am now ready to extend my services to you.
The company, of course, did not think that this was a wise move and
they then went into District Court to try to stop this. Now that you have
had a chance to look at malpractice and breach of fiduciary rules, how
would you handle a case like that, in terms of the model that you are
laying out for us?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Burnele, it's not really hard. I mean, if
this agent were a deliverer of milk, the exact same objection would be
raised. The fact that they are in a confidential relationship-or had been
until they left the employ--of an employer/client to whom they owe
obligations in the lawyer code, makes it an easy case whatever the
theory is. I think it can be handled as legal malpractice, it can be handled
as breach of fiduciary duty. It's an enjoinable offense. I would think it's
a violation of the rights of the plaintiff.
PROFESSOR POWELL: Perhaps it was too easy. The court
decided that there was no showing that damages had occurred in this
circumstance and refused to issue an injunction on it.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Was that reported?
PROFESSOR POWELL: You know, I don't know. I doubt that it
was. I thought it was so egregious that I would not have reported it.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Maybe that's why it is not reported.
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PROFESSOR POWELL: But the view that was taken by the court
was that no injuries could be shown at this point. Of course, what the
parties were arguing was that merely by putting the company, the client,
the former firm in the position where they have to wonder what is being
disclosed was enough of a breach and should have been enjoined.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: That's a bizarre case. There are several
other cases where courts have granted and affirmed injunctions in
circumstances very similar to that.
PROFESSOR POWELL: One last point. I don't remember the
name of the attorney that was involved, but the case involved AnheuserBusch. So it was an interesting episode.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Yes.
PROFESSOR SIMON: I have a question. Chuck, it seems that
almost every plaintiffs lawyer, well, many plaintiffs' lawyers, allege a
conflict of interest when they sue either for legal malpractice or breach
of fiduciary duty, but one of the reasons they like to do that is that they
can say that a conflict of interest is a breach of fiduciary duty. And yet
there are no automatic damages for a conflict of interest. Why are
plaintiffs' attorneys so interested in pleading conflicts of interest as part
of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty cases?
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Well, I think it's because of the
forensic advantage. You can get your expert witness on the witness stand
and without objection or at least without successful objection, the expert
can use the talk of or maybe read right from and identify the source;
Meinhard v. Salmon 183 seems to insist on a standard higher than what
legal malpractice does. Legal malpractice is a somewhat ordinary
standard of care exercised by the lawyer of ordinary, reasonable, et
cetera. That's not as high of a road as Meinhard seems to be. I'm not
sure it was intended to be, but maybe it was. It's that forensic advantage
that I think plaintiffs' lawyers are seeking. And often, as I say, you will
find judges instructing the jury using words like those in Meinhard.
That's pretty powerful ammunition. If I was a plaintiffs lawyer in any
case, I would plead fiduciary duty, fiduciary breach.
PROFESSOR GILLERS: Steve Gillers. To answer Roy's question
and make a few comments about Charles' paper, I think another reason a
law firm suing a law finn might assert conflicts is that there may have
been multiple choices available to the defendant law firm, A, B or C.
The defendant law firm chose A. That might have been reasonable
absent the conflict. But plaintiffs law firm may want to argue that the
183.

164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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defendant law firm was not in a position to make an independent
objective judgment as among the three strategies, A, B or C, because B
would impinge on the interests of another client. And so, it's not purely
forensic in the sense of having a platform for argument or exciting the
jury, but it may explain a choice harshly that, absent the conflict, would
appear reasonable.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Steve, I don't disagree with that, but
what I'm saying about that though is that it is certainly well within the
established bounds of legal malpractice law to make exactly that
argument. You don't need fiduciary breach.
PROFESSOR GILLERS: I was just responding to Roy's forensic
question. And I think it's valuable to do what you are doing because I
have, as we all have, experienced rather casual use of both theories of
recovery in the case law. As far as Milbank Tweed goes, it is true that the
Second Circuit talked about a lesser burden of causation in a breach of
fiduciary duty action. But in a later case in the circuit, it casts serious
doubt on that position. And then in a recent case a state supreme court
justice in a litigation against Weil Gotshal relied on the Milbank
precedent for the lower burden of proof. And on appeal, this will give
you some comfort, the First Department said no, there is not a lower
burden of proof, and Federal suggestions that under New York law there
is, are wrong. 184 It also said that in this jurisdiction we have always said
that when there are fiduciary duty claims and malpractice claims, they
merge and they become a malpractice claim. So, New York may be
following the course you advocate. My last point is that I would urge
you not to create a closed universe of fiduciary duty claims; that is, you
identified three categories where you think they are legitimate as
independent claims. And I agree with your categories. I think you might
try to tease out an overarching principle and not suggest that those can
be the only categories. Because there may be others where it fits, where
it's appropriately in sync with those three categories that we cannot now
foresee. I think that if you do that and provide guidance, I think that
opportunity to get the courts to accept the divisions you are urging is
heightened.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Well, possibly. I, of course, made the
effort in thinking through these issues to come up with a concept of
fiduciary breach that would make good sense and stand on its own feet,
separate and apart from legal malpractice. But I despair of the effort

184. See Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d
593 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
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because I believe that almost every obligation a lawyer has is rooted in
fiduciary concepts. Again, in response to a comment made earlier, I
simply fail to understand why what a lawyer is doing for a client,
whether done carelessly or not, is irrelevant to fiduciary concepts. It
seems to me that for most clients in terms of importance, it's the most
important thing a lawyer can be doing. "Do my job carefully for
heaven's sake. Also do it loyally, also do it with confidentiality. But for
heaven's sake do it well, do it competently." In the Restatement, for
example, when we list the duties of a lawyer to a client in the rationale
section, that's the concept we rely on, the fiduciary nature of the
relationship. The entrusting of the task from client to lawyer is the
reason for requiring competence. I can't cabin it, at least I can't cabin it
in a way that makes sense.
MR. TEMPLE: Ralph Temple. Your complaint that it gives the
lawyer, the plaintiffs lawyer, a rhetorical advantage when you've got a
category of intimacy between the lawyer and the client that is higher,
that falls into this spectrum that they call fiduciary duty, and you are
talking about an even higher standard of care and candor, that's no
different than talking about negligence, gross negligence and reckless
disregard. It's language, it's linguistics. And it sounds to me that the
more we talk about it, when you stop looking at these advantages that
the plaintiffs get out of a higher duty of care, out of an even more than
usual intimacy in the relationship, that it sounds appropriate.
PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: Well, I don't argue with it at a level of
generality. I don't even argue with it as a concept of morality. I don't
argue with it in terms of policy. But my problem with it is using it as a
standard. And I misled you if you see equivalence between legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, if you see the equivalence
there between negligence and gross negligence. It's actually negligence
and less than negligence. The higher standard is one that the lawyer has
to comply with which gives the plaintiff a lower burden.
MR. TEMPLE: I'm saying it's the language though, it's what you
are calling a rhetorical advantage. You are calling it an unfair rhetorical
advantage and I'm raising the question of whether it isn't a fair
rhetorical advantage. Because it's language which is what gross versus
ordinary negligence is. It's language that characterizes a sense of values
that we have about it. And similarly here when you have these categories
where the relationship has been more intimate, where the client had even
a greater degree of trust in the lawyer, for whatever the subject matter
was, than is the normal degree of trust, the plaintiff should have that
rhetorical advantage.
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PROFESSOR WOLFRAM: That's not how the concept is used
though. It's used in every conflict-of-interest case. There is no decision
outside of Illinois and Maryland, and a couple of other states, that says
that you can't plead a conflict-of-interest legal-malpractice case
alternatively as a breach of fiduciary duty case. And most of those cases
are saying that it's just another way of saying legal malpractice. In other
words, it's not, at least in the court's contemplation, a higher standard of
conduct exacted from the lawyer, a lower standard of proof exacted from
the plaintiff. It's the same thing using different words. If that's the case,
if we take courts at their word for that, it seem to me it is unfair to use
Meinhard v. Salmon language to decide what is meant to be the same
thing as legal malpractice.
PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you very much. [Applause]
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